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Marriage Age in Islamic and Contemporary 
Muslim Family Laws 
A Comparative Survey 
by Andrea Büchler and Christina Schlatter 
Abstract 
Throughout the world, marriage arguably is one of the most important social and legal institutions. The socially 
and legally recognised bond between a man and a woman lies at the heart of most families. However, there is no 
globally uniform understanding of marriage. Its meaning is inseparably linked to culture, religion and social class. 
The purpose of this essay is limited to providing a comparative perspective on the situation in five different Arab 
and Islamic countries. The main focus is on the minimum age for marriage. Child marriages are a major concern of 
both human rights organisations and international treaties. There is a strong link between marriageable age and the 
overall status of women in society: the earlier a woman marries, the more the time for her education, employment 
and personal development is constrained.1 
In many countries, various attempts have been made to ban marriages between minors. In Arab and Islamic coun-
tries, difficulties in this area also arise from tensions between traditional interpretations of religious sources on the 
one hand, and international treaty commitments on the other. 
The first section of this paper introduces the classical Islamic law position on marriageability. The second part pro-
vides a brief outline of the international framework with regard to the age at which marriage is permitted. The third 
and central part is dedicated to an analysis of legal developments in five different Islamic countries - Morocco, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan – as well as a consideration of the political, historical and social frame-
work of marriage in those countries and the current legal situations which apply there. The fourth and final part of 
the paper recapitulates the results of this analysis and presents the conclusions drawn from it. 
 
I. Part One: Classical Islamic law on marriageability 
 
1. Sharia and the schools of law 
Classical Islamic law comprises a system of rules whose development had been more or less 
completed by the end of the ninth century. It represents a particular interpretation of the reli-
gious sources on which it is based. It is not codified, but is set out in a number of substantial 
private works promulgated by renowned Islamic jurists and scholars who saw it as their task 
not to develop a new set of laws, but rather to lend formal substance to a set of laws which 
 
 Prof. Dr. iur., Chair of Private and Comparative Law, University of Zurich, Faculty of Law. 
 lic. iur., University of Zurich, Faculty of Law. 
1 The most influencial factor reducing child marriages seems to be education, cf. the statistics and analyses by UNICEF, Early 
Marriage: A Harmful Traditional Practice. A Statistical Exploration, passim (2005). Marriages are often postponed until 
education is finished. On the other hand the educational level also influences the perception of the ideal marriage age, see for 
instance E. FAWZY, Muslim Personal Status Law in Egypt: The Current Situation and Possibilities of Reform Through Internal 
Initiatives, in L. Welchman (Ed.), Women’s Rights and Islamic Family Law. Perspectives on Reform, 17-94, at 47 (2004) 
(Egypt). For more general information cf. T. B. HEATON, Socioeconomic and Familial Status of Women Associated With Age 
at First Marriage in Three Islamic Societies, Vol. 27 No. 1 Journal of Comparative Family Studies 41-58, at 41 et seq. (1996). 
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were already given and which would endure forever. Islamic law is thus not a national law, 
but rather a source and a point of reference for a legal order. Hence one has to distinguish the 
legal codifications of individual countries, such as Egypt, Iran or Afghanistan from classical 
Islamic law. The relationship between these national legal orders and the sharia varies, as does 
the Islamic imprint of the laws of these individual states. Islamic law and Islamic legal concepts 
and perceptions thus refer to transnational phenomena which are linked to the past. 
According to classical doctrine, Islamic law is essentially based on four sources, which are 
ranked as follows: first the Quran and the Sunna (the way, the sayings and the manners of the 
Prophet) – the two primary sources of Islamic law – then ijma (the consensus of legal scholars) 
and qiyas (interpretation through analogy) – the two secondary sources.2 The Quran is the su-
preme source of law and is considered an imperative. It consists of 114 suras and more than 
6,000 verses. Of this total of over 6,000 verses, however, only relatively few – the figure is vari-
ously given as anything from 50 to 800 – deal with questions of law.3 Numerous methods and 
principles, the usul al-fiqh,4 serve to derive legal rules from the religious sources and to guide 
the exercise of ijtihad,5 the independent and personal reasoning and interpretation of those 
sources. The result is a highly elaborated and well-defined, yet at the same time flexible and 
adaptable, system of jurisprudence, the fiqh. The various schools of legal thought also have 
their own individual methods for interpreting source texts and take differing views on specific 
legal matters. There are four main schools of legal thought in Sunni Islam: the Hanafi school, 
the Maliki school, the Shafi’i school and the Hanbali school. The names of the schools refer to 
the names of the leading legal scholars Abu Hanifa, Malik ibn Anas, Muhammad ibn Idris al-
Shafi’i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal.6 The four schools are regarded as equivalent and believers are 
free to choose among them. Countries of the Islamic world usually adhere to a specific school, 
the choice being an expression of the different geographical roots and extensions of the schools: 
the Hanafi school, which is the largest of the Sunni schools,7 prevails in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as in Turkey and several Asian countries. The Maliki 
school predominates in North Africa as well as Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, 
whereas the Shafi’i school is preponderant in the countries of Eastern Africa and South East 
Asia. The Hanbali school of law, which is the smallest and most conservative of the Sunni 
schools, prevails in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.8 In addition to the four Sunni schools of law there 
are also Shia schools of legal thought. Shia is a separate sect of Islam which diverged from the 
Sunni branch in a succession controversy which arose following the death of the Prophet in 
632.9 The most influential and largest school of Shia Islam is the Jafari school named after the 
 
2 Cf. M. H. KAMALI, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 3rd Edition 16, 228 (2003); K. S. VIKØR, Between God and the Sultan 3 
(2005). 
3 Cf. KAMALI, supra note 2 at 25; A. SAEED, Interpreting the Qur’ān: Towards a Contemporary Approach 16 (2006). The legal 
section deals with the issues of marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody, paternity, inheritance law, law on the sale of 
goods, rent, murder, space, military law and the laws of evidence. They constitute the basis of what is called Islamic law. 
4 See KAMALI, supra note 2 at 117. 
5 See KAMALI, supra note 2 at 469. 
6 Cf. W. B. HALLAQ, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law 150 (2005); VIKØR, supra note 2 at 89. 
7 Cf. A. SAEED, The Qur'an: An Introduction 17 (2008). 
8 Cf. SAEED, supra note 7 at 17. 
9 The point of contention was the question of whether the Prophet’s successor ought to be chosen solely according to his 
qualifications, as was deemed appropriate by the Sunni view, or whether potential candidates with no blood ties to the 
Prophet ought to be debarred from succeeding him, as required by the Shia opinion. After the Sunni choice eventually fell on 
Abu Bakr Abdallah ibn Abi Quhafa al-Siddiq, the Prophet’s former father-in-law, the Shia ultimately opted to secede, cf. M. 
A. SHOMALI, Shi'i Islam. Origins, Faith and Practices, 14 et seq. (2003).  
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Islamic scholar and imam Ja’far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq.10 Besides the Jafari school, there are 
numerous smaller schools of law in Shia Islam. In Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Oman followers of the Jafari school constitute significant minorities, while in Bahrain, 
Lebanon and Iraq they form the majority of the Muslim population.11 In Iran, Shia Islam as 
specified by the Jafari school is the declared state religion. The Shia view not only differs from 
Sunni Islam with regard to the succession of the Prophet but also in respect of matters of meth-
odology.12 
The core of sharia law is family law. Family law is at the heart of Islamic law because, within 
the sharia, it is the branch of the law with the greatest density of regulation emanating from the 
highest-ranking sources. The reason it has maintained its relevance until the present day is that 
it is the part of sharia law which was successfully protected against encroachment by European 
codes during the colonial era and has also remained untouched by the various degrees of secu-
larisation which have occurred in Arab and Islamic countries. While the nineteenth century 
saw large swathes of Islamic law being eradicated and replaced by codifications on the conti-
nental European model, most countries with a predominantly Islamic population have main-
tained sharia-based family law to this day.13 
Thus, for many Muslim men and women, family law has become a symbol of collective identi-
ty, and adherence to it an absolute and inviolable core of belonging to the Muslim religious 
community.14 While, in countries of the Islamic world themselves, family law is an instrument 
of patriarchal, conservative power and policy, it is also an indispensable source of protection 
and order for family units both large and small. The way in which religious pronouncements 
have been codified, however, varies significantly from country to country. Comparative analy-
sis of family-law provisions based on Islamic principles reveals not only the diversity and dy-
namism of Islamic legal tradition, but also the flexibility and interpretative openness of Islamic 
legal rules. Given the sheer size of the territory under Islamic influence, the number of individ-
ual historical, social, economic and political factors which have shaped the various legal sys-
tems is vast and the range of provisions is correspondingly wide.15 
 
2. Classical Islamic family law on marriageability 
Marriage, nikah, in Islam is a highly religious covenant. However, it is not religious in the sense 
of constituting a sacrament, but rather in the sense of realising the essence of Islam. It is a civil 
contract legitimising sexual relations and procreation.16 According to the Quran, everyone who 
is physically, mentally and financially capable of so doing has the obligation of entering into a 
marriage.17 The contract is concluded by mutual consent, with the offer of marriage and its 
 
10 In Islam the imam is a spiritual leader. The followers of the Jafari school recognise twelve imams, which is why they are 
also referred to as Twelver Shiites. Ja’far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq was the sixth of the twelve imams. 
11 Cf. also I. ABDAL-HAQQ, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, in H. M. Ramadan (Ed.) Understanding 
Islamic Law 1-42, 29 (2006). 
12 By way of example, Shia do not recognise ijma as a source of law, cf. SHOMALI, supra note 9 at 69. 
13 Cf. N. J. COULSON, A History of Islamic Law, 149 (1964). 
14 Cf. S. POULTER, The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of Personal Status Law for British Muslims, in C. Mallat & J. Con-
nors (Eds.), Islamic Family Law 147-166, at 147 (1990). 
15 Cf. A. A. AN-NA’IM, Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book 16, passim (2002); L. WELCHMAN, 
Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States: A Comparative Overview of Textual Development and Advocacy, passim 
(2007); J. J. NASIR, The Islamic Law of Personal Status, 3rd Edition 34 (2009). 
16 See J. L. ESPOSITO & N. J. DELONG-BAS (Eds.), Women in Muslim Family Law, 2nd Edition 15 (2001). See also Z. MIR-
HOSSEINI, Marriage on Trial. A Study of Islamic Family Law, 2nd Edition 31 (2000). 
17 Cf. sura 24, verses 32 and 33. 
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acceptance being expressed by the two future spouses or their proxies18.19 The state plays no 
role in these proceedings, its non-involvement being most evident in the fact that registration 
of the marriage is not a prerequisite for the validity of the marriage contract.20 According to the 
Sunni schools of law, the presence of two male witnesses is necessary.21 
A marriage contract is valid only if both spouses possess full legal capacity. Legal capacity is 
defined as being both of age and of sound mind.22 Marriageable age according to classical Is-
lamic law coincides with the occurrence of puberty. The notion of puberty refers to signs of 
physical maturity such as the emission of semen or the onset of menstruation. In the absence of 
such signs, the Hanafi school assumes that puberty will occur no later than at eighteen years 
for males and seventeen years for females.23 At these ages the spouses are deemed to have at-
tained full legal capacity to enter a marriage and are no longer considered minors in this re-
gard. While marriageable age is not the same as the age of legal majority in civil law, the two 
age limits may nevertheless correspond.24 In contrast to the Hanafi opinion, both the Shafi’i 
and the Hanbali school set the age of the legal capacity to marry at fifteen years for both sexes, 
while the Maliki school draws the line at seventeen years.25 According to the Jafari school, fif-
teen years for boys and nine years for girls is considered as the age of majority.26 According to 
the Hanafi school there is a presumption that girls do not reach puberty until the age of nine 
and boys not until the age of twelve.27 In Islamic teaching, girls cannot therefore be deemed to 
have reached puberty any early than nine, while for boys the minimum age is twelve.  
Having reached full legal capacity, the spouses are also required to consent freely to the mar-
riage.28 However, in Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali teaching, a woman cannot conclude a marriage 
contract on her own and is required – despite her legal capacity – to obtain the consent of her 
guardian, or wali.29 In contrast, both the Hanafi school and the Shia doctrine allow the woman 
 
18 One must differentiate between the conclusion of the contract by proxy, where the future spouses are of full legal capacity 
and authorise a proxy in order to conclude the contract for them, and guardianship in marriage. Guardianship in marriage 
takes place because the ward does not have the legal capacity to decide on the marriage and the power of decision is there-
fore conferred to the guardian (wali), usually the father of the spouse. For a general survey of guardianship see Nasir, supra 
note 15 at 186 et seq., for more details about guardianship in marriage see J. J. NASIR, The Status of Women Under Islamic 
Law and Modern Islamic Legislation, 3rd Edition 49 et seq. (2009); NASIR, supra note 15 at 52 et seq. See also R. SHAHAM, 
Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt. A Study Based on Decisions by the Shari’a Courts, 1900 – 1955, at 43 (1997). 
19 See NASIR, supra note 15 at 48. For more detailed information see K. ALI, Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: A 
Survey of Doctrines, in A. Quraishi & F. E. Vogel (Eds.), The Islamic Marriage Contract. Case Studies in Islamic Family Law 
11-45, at 13 et seq. (2008). See also D. S. EL ALAMI, The Marriage Contract in Islamic Law in the Shari'ah and Personal Status 
Laws of Egypt and Morocco 20 et seq. (1992). 
20 See A. BÜCHLER, Das Islamische Familienrecht: Eine Annäherung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses des 
klassischen Islamischen Rechts zum geltenden Ägyptischen Familienrecht 26 et seq. (2003).  
21 The presence of one male and two female witnesses is considered sufficient as well. By contrast, the presence of witnesses 
is not necessary according to Shia Islam. See ALI, supra note 19 at 17. 
22 Legal capacity means being of age and of sound mind, see EL ALAMI, supra note 19 at 49. 
23 Cf. L. BAKHTIAR, Encyclopedia of Islamic Law. A Compendium of the Major Schools, 403 (1996). 
24 Cf. WELCHMAN, supra note 15 at 63.  
25 Cf. BAKHTIAR, supra note 23 at 403; M. ZAHRAA, The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law, Vol. 11 No. 3 Arab Law 
Quarterly 245-263, at 250, footnote 37 (1996). 
26 Cf. BAKHTIAR, supra note 23 at 403. 
27 Cf. A. A. KHAN & T. M. KHAN (Eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islamic Law, Vol. 3, 48 (2007); BAKHTIAR, supra note 2323 at 403. 
28 See A. A. KHAN & T. M. KHAN (Eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islamic Law, Vol. 6, 22 (2007). 
29 Cf. KHAN & KHAN, supra note 28 at 22, 28; E. Y. KRIVENKO, Women, Islam and International Law. Within the Context of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 60 (2009). The main reason given for the 
necessity of the guardian's contribution is the need to protect the woman, cf. D. S. EL ALAMI, Legal Capacity with Specific 
Reference to the Marriage Contract, Vol. 6 No. 2 Arab Law Quarterly 190-204, at 193 (1991). However, most Islamic jurists 
agree that the guardian has the obligation to secure the approval of the bride, see BÜCHLER, supra note 20 at 28. 
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to act on her own behalf, without an intermediary.30 Despite this, it is a commonly observed 
traditional custom for an adult woman to authorise her guardian to settle the contract details in 
her stead.31 
Notwithstanding the precondition of mutual consent, all schools recognise the power of a 
guardian to marry off his ward before she reaches puberty, and it is not uncommon for this in 
fact to occur shortly after the female child is born.32 In this case, the consummation of the mar-
riage must be postponed until puberty.33 The so-called ‘option of puberty’ offers the minor the 
possibility of objecting to the marriage upon attaining puberty, for as long as the marriage has 
not yet been consummated.34 However, classical opinions agree that this right of objection can 
be excercised only through a court and that it is applicable only to marriages concluded by a 
person other than the father or grandfather of the minor.35  
The issue of child marriage is one on which there is considerable controversy within Islamic 
teaching. Scholars argue that the core element of the Islamic marriage contract is the consent of 
both spouses.36 Thus, a child marriage arranged by the guardians violates the sharia - either 
because the will of the future spouses is not sufficiently respected or because a minor does not 
have the mental maturity effectively to consent to marriage. One argument that is often put 
forward in support of the practice of child marriage is the marriage of the Prophet Muhammad 
to Aisha, who was only been seven years old when the marriage took place.37  
 
3. Modernisation and codification 
The main challenges to the classical Islamic position on marriageable age have stemmed from 
processes of modernisation and codification. Generally speaking, Islamic family-law structures 
are largely self-regulating, informal in nature, situation-specific and essentially flexible. More 
importantly, Islamic law is inherently suited to reform. Many efforts are being undertaken to 
re-read classical Islamic law and to liberate it from rigidities. There is a growing global move-
ment of scholars who are re-reading the fundamental and canonical Islamic texts with a view 
to finding a perspective which does not essentialise Islamic law or subject it to a generalising 
construction. This is an initiative which is redynamising Islamic thought. 
While independent interpretation of religious sources was something early Islamic scholars 
took for granted, over time the practice became increasingly restricted. No later than the tenth 
 
30 See KHAN & KHAN, supra note 28 at 22, 28; NASIR, supra note 15 at 52 et seq. (2009); EL ALAMI, supra note 29 at 193; ZAH-
RAA, supra note 25 at 257.  
31 With regard to the person of the guardian the schools hold different views. Most give precedence to the father of the bride, 
namely the Maliki, Shafi‘i, Hanbali and the Jafari school, while, according to the Hanafi school, the son of the bride has prior-
ity. The schools differ when it comes to the order of priority in the absence of a father or a son respectively, but the majority 
of them recognises the judge as the ultimate guardian if there is no other possible guardian, see BAKHTIAR, supra note 23 at 
425 et seq. 
32 See COULSON, supra note 13 at 178; ZAHRAA, supra note 25 at 259; D. PEARL & W. MENSKI, Muslim Family Law, 3rd Edition 
154 (1998). 
33 See ZAHRAA, supra note 25 at 259, footnote 99; BÜCHLER, supra note 20 at 27. 
34 See ZAHRAA, supra note 25 at 259; PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 32 at 143; F. RAHMAN, A Survey of Modernization of Mus-
lim Family Law, Vol. 11 No. 4 International Journal of Middle East Studies 451-465, at 455 (1980) and BÜCHLER, supra note 20 
at 29 et seq. If the ward is ignorant of the marriage the option of puberty is lost only if not exercised upon the discovery of 
the marriage. In contrast, being ignorant of the option of puberty itself does not conserve the right to object, cf. K. HODKIN-
SON, Muslim Family Law: A Sourcebook, 231 (1984). 
35 Cf. NASIR, supra note 18 at 29; H. M. KAMALI, Law in Afghanistan. A Study of the Constitution, Matrimonial Law and the 
Judiciary 107 (1985); HODKINSON, supra note 34 at 231; I. SCHNEIDER, Registration, Court System, and Procedure in Afghan 
Family Law, 12 Yearbook of Islamic & Middle Eastern Law 209-234, 222 (2005/2006). 
36 See NASIR, supra note 18 at 28 et seq. 
37 See EL ALAMI, supra note 19 at 51 and SHAHAM, supra note 18 at 53. 
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century, a broad consensus had become established to the effect that ijtihad, the ‘gate to inde-
pendent interpretation’, had closed, that Islamic law had been comprehensively structured and 
interpreted and that its formulation had reached such a stage of completeness and finality that 
all future generations were bound by the views of their predecessors, who were alone in being 
authorised to engage in ijtihad. The creative legal enthusiasm of Islamic scholars of jurispru-
dence gradually dried up along with their hermeneutic freedom, with the result that Islamic 
law became a rigid, ossified and systematically self-contained set of norms on which external 
influences exerted little sway.38 
Major changes in Islamic societies, partly due to the fact that Western ways of life and Western 
science were beginning to infiltrate the Islamic world, prompted new, reform-oriented herme-
neutic interpretation of religious source texts. Efforts by Muslim intellectuals to bring about 
social, political and legal reform were particularly prevalent in the nineteenth century. Under 
the Ottoman Empire, many of these efforts were aimed at centralising and consolidating the 
state. Governments’ new powers to regulate coalesced with the traditional Islamic legal sys-
tem, which, until then, had been the sole source of law. Personal status law was the only area 
in which the dominance of classical Islamic law was left intact.39 Other efforts were inspired by 
the state’s need to adapt to new economic developments. The inability of the traditional Islamic 
rules to cope with the complex commercial relationships with European countries which had 
evolved during the last decades of the nineteenth century resulted in radical reforms, especial-
ly in commercial and procedural law.40 Profound reforms were also associated with the process 
of colonialisation, which was itself inherently based on the premise that the regulatory power 
of government, and not the rules developed by Islamic jurists, is the main source of law.41 Co-
lonialisation not only led to the scope of traditional Islamic law being marginalised, but also 
meant that the more limited role enjoyed by Islamic law was further encroached upon by statu-
tory regulation.42 
In family law, the process of codification, as an arena for contesting different positions, is the 
main force driving reform. The first post-colonial national family-law codes were promulgated 
in the 1950s and the process of reform - with its patterns of consultation, reciprocal borrowings 
from jurisprudential arguments and advocacy for progress - continues to this day.43 This pro-
cess of codification has continued over the past three decades. It has been characterised, on the 
one hand, by substantive amendments being made to existing family-law codifications and, on 
the other hand, by the adoption of a series of newer codifications.44 In a few countries, howev-
 
38 Cf. SAEED, supra note 3 at 145; A. BÜCHLER, Hermeneutik und Recht in der Tradition des Islam, in M. Senn & B. Fritschi 
(Eds.), Rechtswissenschaft und Hermeneutik, Kongress der Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 
ARSP-Beiheft 117, 185-206, at 197 (2009). 
39 Cf. L. ABU-ODEH, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1043-
1146, 1079 (2004). 
40 Cf. ABU-ODEH, supra note 39 at 1084. 
41 Cf. ABU-ODEH, supra note 39 at 1088 et seq. 
42 Cf. ABU-ODEH, supra note 39 at 1088 et seq. The process of codification of Islamic family law began in the Middle East with 
the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917. In the 1920s and 1940s Egypt enacted some laws concerning family-law matters 
without issuing an overall code. 
43 See WELCHMAN, supra note 15 at 33. Such codifications emerged, for example, in Jordan (Law No. 92 of 1951 of Family 
Rights), Syria (Law No. 95 of 1953 of Personal Status), Tunisia (Order No. 13 of 1956 on the Promulgation of the Code on 
Personal Status), Morocco (Ordinance No. 1-57-343 of 1957 implementing books I and II of the Law of Personal Status) and 
Iraq (Law No. 188 of 1959 of Personal Status). 
44 New codifications came into force for instance in Qatar (Amiri Decree No. 22 of 2006 regarding the Law of the Family) and 
the United Arab Emirates (Federal Law No. 28 of 2005 on Personal Status). Important revisions took place in Egypt (Law No. 
1 of 2000 regulating certain litigation procedures in personal status), Jordan (Temporary Law No. 82 of 2001 amending the 
Law of Personal Status) and Morocco (Law No. 70-03 of 2004 on the Family Code). 
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er, most notably Saudi Arabia, sharia was declared the relevant source of state law and statuto-
ry legislation was restricted to administrative matters. 
Although no two codes are the same, since legislation is subject to political contingencies re-
flecting national and international dynamics, the family-law reforms undertaken in many Is-
lamic and Arab countries are nevertheless testimony to processes of modernisation. Polygamy, 
for example, has been made contingent on certain conditions being met, divorce by repudiation 
has been made harder, women’s rights to petition for divorce have been strengthened, registra-
tion requirements for marriage and divorce have been introduced, post-divorce maintenance 
under certain circumstances has been introduced, the parental custody rights of the mother 
have been extended and the marriageable age has been raised.45 Pleas for systematic further 
progress along this route are regularly heard.  
Today’s modern Islamic legal scholars are adopting a variety of methodological approaches in 
order to circumvent the narrow restrictions placed on their work by classical Islamic scholarly 
tradition and the literal adherence to source texts which its exegesis demands. Reference to the 
history of Islam and the historicisation of certain sharia legal concepts is being used as a basis 
for interpretative initiatives, not in the sense that Islam should be abandoned as a point of ref-
erence, but rather that inspiration should again be drawn from its core and that the law should 
be moved closer to its original intent of achieving justice.46 One view put forward in this con-
text is that the density of family-law texts in the Quran demonstrates its efforts to grant women 
a stronger position than that which they had in pre-Islamic times: ‘The principal sources of the 
sharia and Islamic family laws, the Quran and Sunna, represent progressive values – the legal 
regulations that are extrapolated from both these sources advocate, in particular, welfare of 
women and children’47 It is indeed paradoxical that, at the time of Islamic revelation, the very 
verses and regulations which are currently at the centre of criticism and contestation in fact 
heralded a revolution. From a historical perspective, religious Islamic sources should be 
viewed against the background of pre-Islamic times, which Muslims call the jahiliya or ‘time of 
ignorance’. One of the essential objectives of Islam’s message was to bring about a significant 
improvement in the status of women and to establish the family as the core constituent unit in 
society. It was this which ushered in the transformation from a tribal culture to a family-based 
structure, in the course of which protecting the members of a family became the paramount 
imperative. For the first time, women were accorded legal personality and legal rights, and 
ceased to be treated as chattels. Specific rights granted to them included that of owning and 
having charge over property. Women were also granted inheritance rights. The bride’s consent 
became a prerequisite for marriage. Islam forbade the killing of newborn baby girls, a practice 
which had been widespread in pre-Islamic times. Polygamy was restricted. Some restrictions 
were also placed on the divorce rights which husbands had enjoyed in pre-Islamic times and 
wives were also granted certain separation rights of their own. Dowers were to be paid to the 
wife and no longer to her tribe. Finally, women were granted the same status as religious be-
 
45 See M. ROHE, Das Islamische Recht. Geschichte und Gegenwart 209, 214, 226 (2009); for a comparative review encompass-
ing several countries, see WELCHMAN, supra note 15, passim; ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 16 at 47. Important mate-
rial on this can also be found in AN-NA’IM, supra note 15 at 26, 40, 67, 93, 153, 191, 204, 247, 284. 
46 For a groundbreaking contribution to this debate, see for example AN-NA’IM, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspec-
tives. A Quest for Consensus (1992); N. ABU ZAYD, Reformation of Islamic Thought. A Critical Historical Analysis (2006); A. 
WADUD, Qur’an and Woman. Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (1999). Regarding various modern 
hermeneutic interpretations, cf. BÜCHLER, supra note 38 at 200.  
47 J. REHMAN, The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human Rights Law: Examining the Theory and Practice of 
Polygamy and Talaq, 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 108-127, 113 (2007). Cf. also COULSON, supra 
note 13 at 14.  
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lievers as men.48 Admittedly, the reforms ushered in by Islam served less to turn existing social 
order on its head than to place as many restrictions on the customary laws which had prevailed 
in pre-Islamic times as the society of the day was prepared to accept and understand. The de-
gree of detail in which certain verses of Islamic family law are formulated is largely a reflection 
of the efforts being made at that time to provide women with effective protection. However, it 
is precisely this density of regulation which is proving a constant hindrance to the ongoing 
development of family law towards greater gender equality – unless, of course, the Quran is 
read in its historic context, based on its spirit of introducing a gradual and progressive change 
to the status of women in the context of the transition from a tribal to an Islamic society, as its 
ideals anticipated. Many Islamic legal scholars emphasise that the basic ethical norm of the 
Quran is equality between the sexes.49  
 
II. Part Two: International framework 
While child marriage is widespread in the Arab and Islamic world it is also commonly encoun-
tered elsewhere as well.50 Marriages involving very young spouses are frequently concluded in 
the light of financial, property or relationship considerations and in order to secure not only 
the child’s but also the family’s interests.51 They are often more rooted in local customary tradi-
tions than in classical Islamic law, especially in rural areas.52 Since extra-marital relationships 
are strictly forbidden in Islam, marriage relieves the father of a girl of his duty to protect her 
chastity and thus the honour of the family.53 Child marriages are also commonly seen as a 
means of elongating marital life and thus enhancing procreation.54 
However, there is a growing international consensus that child marriages need to be eradicat-
ed, and this consensus finds expression in international law.55 Child marriages deprive chil-
dren, and especially girls, of the opportunity to gain a proper education and thus make it im-
possible for them to pursue a professional career.56 They are not allowed to experience real 
childhood and adolescence, but are expected to take over familial responsibility at a very early 
age.57 From a medical point of view, there are also major concerns about girls getting married 
when they are still very young. First, the risks of complications during pregnancy and child-
 
48 Quran, sura 33, verse 35. 
49 Cf. the numerous detailed references in S. S. ALI, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law. Equal before 
Allah, Unequal Before Man? 50 (2000). 
50 According to the latest available demographic surveys, more than 51 million girls between the ages of 15 and 19 are cur-
rently married worldwide. However, there is also a high estimated number of unknown cases as the underlying statistics do 
not contain any information on girls younger than 15 years, see Human Rights Watch, „How Come You Allow Little Girls to 
Get Married?“, Child Marriage in Yemen, 2011, 15, available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/12/07/how-come-you-
allow-little-girls-get-married [16 November 2012]. 
51 See I. SCHNEIDER, supra note 35 at 224 et seq.; SHAHAM, supra note 18 at 45; BÜCHLER, supra note 20 at 30. See also UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, Early Marriage. Child Spouses, 7 Innocenti Digest 1, at 6 (2001), available at: www.unicef-
irc.org/publications/pdf/digest7e.pdf [16 November 2012]; Human Rights Watch, supra note 50 at 16.  
52 Cf. KAMALI, supra note 35 at 109; Human Rights Watch, supra note 50 at 15 et seq. 
53 See EL ALAMI, supra note 19 at 51; PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 32 at 153. See also ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 16 
at 14 and UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, supra note 51 at 6. 
54 See UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, supra note 51 at 2. 
55 However, the practice has not fully disappeared yet, see UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, supra note 51 at 5. 
56 See Y. ERTÜRK, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences of 23 June 
2009, A/HRC/11/6/Add.6 at 46, available at: www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/rapporteur/docs/A.HRC.11.6.Add.6.pdf 
[16 November 2012]; UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, supra note 51 at 11. 
57 Cf. Human Rights Watch, supra note 50 at 16. 
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birth are much higher when physical maturity has not yet fully developed.58 Second, most ado-
lescents are not familiar with methods of contraception or protection against sexually transmit-
ted diseases.59 Third and most importantly, children can be severely traumatised by early sexu-
al experiences, particularly when these are unwanted. Beyond this, it is a proven fact that mi-
nor girls tend to fall victim to domestic violence far more often than grown-up women.60  
Given the importance and sensitive nature of this matter, there have been numerous attempts 
to define minimum age standards for marriage through international agreements. However, 
since there is no universal understanding of what constitutes marriage, it is virtually impossi-
ble to establish principles and rules which command universal approval and observance. These 
difficulties are reflected in the international treaties on the subject, which often either fail to set 
an exact age limit for marriage or else circumscribe it in a rather vague manner. Other conven-
tions, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child61, do not address the matter at all.62 
Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights63 credits men and women of full age 
the right to marry, while failing to give any indication as to the exact age at which this full age 
is reached. Likewise, Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights64 
calls for both spouses to be of marriageable age, but without further specification. Article 16 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)65 
declares child marriages invalid and urges the state parties to implement a minimum age for 
marriage, yet remains silent with regard to what constitutes an appropriate minimum age for 
marriage. Even article 2 of the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Mar-
riage and Registration of Marriages66 does not itself establish a clear age limit but calls on the 
signatory states to do this themselves.67 Article 11 of the Convention on Celebration and 
Recognition of the Validity of Marriages68 does not mention a minimum age as a precondition 
of a valid marriage but relies on the mental capacity and free will of the spouses, as does article 
10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights69. A more decisive 
approach was adopted in 1965 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
who restricted marriage to age 15 and above, albeit with the option of earlier marriage in ex-
ceptional cases.70 
 
58 See UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, supra note 51 at 10 et seq.; L. DAVIDS, Female Subordination Starts at Home: Con-
sequences of Young Marriage and Proposed Solutions, 5 Regent Journal of International Law 299, at 300 (2007) ; Human 
Rights Watch, supra note 50 at 16. 
59  See H. RASHAD & M. OSMAN & F. ROUDI-FAHIMI, Marriage in the Arab World 3 (2005), available at: 
www.prb.org/pdf05/MarriageInArabWorld_Eng.pdf [16 November 2012], and DAVIDS, supra note 58 at 300. 
60 See DAVIDS, supra note 58 at 300; UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, supra note 51 at 12; Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 50 at 16. 
61 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3. 
62 Art. 1 of the convention reads: “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the 
age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” 
63 GA Res. 217 A (III), 10 December 1948. 
64 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171. 
65 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1249 UNTS 13. With the exception of 
Iran, all of the Arab states in question have ratified this convention. When looking at the national level in Part Three this 
essay will pay special attention to how the states deal with the convention. The CEDAW is a good example of the collision of 
international and national - or rather cultural - values and the corresponding difficulties of implementation. 
66 1962 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 521 UNTS 231. 
67 As a matter of fact, none of the five Arab states examined in this essay are state parties. 
68 1978 Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages, 1901 UNTS 131. Egypt is the only one of the 
five Arab states surveyed that has ratified this convention. However, it has yet to come into force there. 
69 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3. 
70 Principle II of the Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 
GA Res. 2018 (XX), 1 November 1965. 
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III. Part Three: Marriage age in contemporary Muslim family 
laws 
 
1. Morocco 
 
a) Attempts at unification 
Formerly a French and Spanish protectorate, Morocco gained independence in 1956. The pre-
existing multi-faceted legal system proved to be the main obstacle to the creation of a modern 
nation state. Prior to 1956, Islamic law was predominant in certain regions of the protectorate 
only, whereas large parts of the population with an indigenous Berber background had devel-
oped distinct customary rules over the centuries.71 Whilst the Arab population almost entirely 
followed the Maliki school of legal thought, the tribal population, though religiously commit-
ted to Islam, followed separate customary traditions as far as the law was concerned, particu-
larly in civil-law matters,.72 These usages were not perceived as a departure from Islamic law 
but rather as an integral part of it, since the sharia, though not providing a textual basis for 
them, abstained from an explicit ban.73 As a result, the Moroccan legal system was two-tiered.74 
Rather than challenging this bifurcation in legal practice, the French authorities governing the 
protectorate encouraged tribal self-administration.75 
Moroccan nationhood marked the beginning of a thorough process of codification driven by 
the ambition to harmonise the diverging Arab and Berber practices and create an Islamic 
state.76 A reform of the justice sector divested the tribal authorities of the right to self-
administration and mandated the application of official statutory law.77 The newly enacted 
statutory law was largely based on the French model, while the scope of application of the sha-
ria was limited to inheritance and family-law matters.78 Statutory codification of family law did 
not take place until the promulgation of the so-called Moudawana, the national family-law 
code, in 1958.79 The code harked back to the core values of sharia, while drawing strongly on 
Maliki legal thought for its basis. As a result, not only were the provisions of the code largely 
 
71 See G. H. BOUSQUET, Islamic Law and Customary Law in French North Africa, Vol. 32 No. 3 Journal of Comparative Legis-
lation and International Law, Third Series 57-65, at 57 et seq., 61 et seq. (1950). 
72 See BOUSQUET, supra note 71 at 61 et seq. 
73 See L. ROSEN, Law and Custom in the Popular Legal Culture of North Africa, Vol. 2 No. 2 Islamic Law and Society 194-208, 
at 194 et seq. (1995); cf. the statement of King Muhammad I of 1958 cited by J. N. D. ANDERSON, Reforms in Family Law in 
Morocco, Vol. 2 No. 3 Journal of African Law 146-159, at 146 et seq. (1958). 
74 See BOUSQUET, supra note 71 at 61 et seq. 
75 Cf. B. VENEMA & A. MGUILD, Access to Land and Berber Ethnicity in the Middle Atlas, Morocco, Vol. 39 No. 4 Middle 
Eastern Studies 35-53, at 41 (2003). In 1930, a French decree referred to as the Berber Dahir and signed by the Moroccan 
sultan explicitly sanctioned the application of customary Berber law by tribesmen, cf. W. A. HOISINGTON JR., Cities in Revolt: 
The Berber Dahir (1930) and France’s Urban Strategy in Morocco, Vol. 13 No. 3 Journal of Contemporary History 433-448, at 
433 et seq. (1978). Only penal law was standardised for both Arab and Berber speaking territories, see BOUSQUET, supra note 
71 at 61. 
76 See L. BUSKENS, Recent Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco: Islamic Law as Politics in an Emerging Public Sphere, 
Vol. 10 No. 1 Islamic Law and Society 70-131, at 72 (2003). 
77 Cf. VENEMA & MGUILD, supra note 75 at 41. 
78 Cf. also L. BUSKENS, Sharia and National Law in Morocco, in J. M. Otto (Ed.), Sharia Incorporated. A Comparative Over-
view of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present 89-138, at 131 (2010). 
79 An electronic French version of the document is available at: http://perso.menara.ma/~lezbare/ [16 November 2012]. 
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modelled on Maliki teachings,80 but Maliki jurisprudence was also declared the only applicable 
source of law in all cases where no statutory provisions had been formulated.81 
A telling example of the strong Maliki influence on the Moudawana can be seen in article 12, 
paragraph 1, which established guardianship in marriage by denying women of full legal ca-
pacity the right to enter into marriage without a guardian’s approval.82 Other provisions, how-
ever, such as article 8, did not entirely correspond with classical Maliki teaching. That article 
defined the minimum marriageable age as 15 years for females and 18 years for males, while 
bestowing on the courts the power to permit marriage at an earlier age in cases of hardship. In 
contrast, the classical Maliki school sets minimum marriageable age at 17 years for both sexes.83 
According to the Moudawana, minor children of either sex could be given into marriage by 
their fathers and minor female children could even be forced to marry by parental constraint.84 
Prior to the enactment of the Moudawana, based on classical Maliki law, a father had had the 
power to force his virgin daughter into marriage even after she had reached puberty. The code 
limited this option to cases in which there was deemed to be a danger of immoral behaviour on 
the daughter’s part and made its granting subject to judicial approval.85 Furthermore, the code 
also introduced the mandatory registration of marriage and divorce.86 Although their opposi-
tion to the new code ultimately proved unsuccessful, tribal authorities perceived it as an undue 
intrusion and an unwarranted attempt at unification by the state.87 
In the context of under-age marriage, another relevant piece of legislation enacted during this 
period was the Moroccan Penal Code of 1963, which, except for some minor revisions carried 
out in 1967, is still in force in its original form today. This code criminalises rape and both con-
sensual and violent sexual activity involving minors.88 Consensual sexual activity with minors 
is, however, exempted from prosecution on condition that the culprit marries the victim.89 The 
ulterior motive of this provision is to secure both the victim’s and the family’s honour.90 Thus, 
minors who fall victim to non-violent sexual actions can be married off to the offender, provid-
ed that the minor’s guardian seeks court approval of the marriage and this approval is granted 
by the court. Once the marriage has taken place, criminal investigation can be initiated only by 
a person empowered to demand the annulment of the marriage. Usually, that person would be 
the minor’s guardian, and no criminal investigation can commence until the marriage has been 
judicially annulled.91 
  
 
80  Cf. the statement of King Muhammad I of 1958 cited by Anderson, supra note 73 at 146 et seq.; BUSKENS, supra note 76 at 
73. 
81  See BUSKENS, supra note 76 at 72 et seq. 
82  See BUSKENS, supra note 76 at 74. 
83  See ANDERSON, supra note 73 at 148 et seq., footnote 3; BUSKENS, supra note 76 at 74; MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 16 at 26. 
For the Maliki position see Part One, II. 
84  Art. 12 Para. 4 of the Moudawana of 1958. 
85  Art. 12 Para. 4 of the Moudawana of 1958. See also ANDERSON, supra note 73 at 149 et seq.; NASIR, supra note 18 at 50; 
WELCHMAN, supra note 15 at 64. 
86  See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 16 at 26. 
87  Cf. VENEMA & MGUILD, supra note 75 at 44, 50. 
88  Art. 484 to 486 of the Penal Code of 1963, as amended in 1967. An electronic French version of the document is available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=190447 [16 November 2012]. 
89  Art. 475 of the Penal Code. 
90  See Human Rights Watch, Morocco: Girl’s Death Highlights Flawed Laws, 23 March 2012, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/23/morocco-girl-s-death-highlights-flawed-laws [16 November 2012]. 
91  Art. 475 of the Penal Code. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 90. 
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b) Minor reform in 1993 
The 1990s were marked by political, intellectual and economic liberalisation and the public 
emergence of women’s rights activist groups.92 Mounting calls for a reform of the Moudawana 
coincided with increasingly forceful discussion of human rights in a more general sense. Activ-
ists’ major concerns were the abolition of guardianship in marriage and an increase in the mar-
riageable age for females from 15 to 18 years. Notwithstanding the harsh opposition from reli-
gious and conservative camps, the Moudawana underwent some important changes in 1993. 
The revised code deviated from the classical Maliki opinion in that it made the validity of a 
marriage conditional on the woman’s explicit consent while at the same time revoking a fa-
ther’s previous compulsorily held right to conclude a marriage contract against his daughter’s 
will.93 However, the reform left both the fundamental institution of guardianship in marriage 
and the issue of marriageable age untouched.94 
 
c) The 2004 reform 
Around the turn of the twenty-first century, modernisation of Moroccan family law was the 
principal subject of debate between reformers and traditionalists. In October 2003, the King 
announced a landmark reform of the Moudawana which was adopted by the Morrocan par-
liament in 2004.95 Since this revised Moudawana came into force, the marriageable age has 
been set at 18 years for both sexes.96 Marriage below this age remains permissible, but is con-
tingent upon judicial authorisation. Permission is granted if there are legitimate grounds justi-
fying the marriage, and these grounds must be determined by the courts based on the opinions 
of the parents or the guardian of the minor spouse and on the outcome of a medical evaluation 
or a social inquiry.97 Guardianship in marriage is now abolished and women also have the 
right to enter into matrimony without intermediation.98 Proof of marriage is generally estab-
lished by an officially registered and valid marriage contract.99 However, claims relating to 
unregistered marriages can be judged by the courts taking into account all legal evidence and 
expertise and paying special attention to any pregnancies or children arising from such mar-
riages.100 
Non-recognition of an unregistered marriage by the courts may have severe implications espe-
cially for the children of the marriage concerned, as they are equated with children born out of 
 
92 See BUSKENS, supra note 76 at 104; K. ŽVAN, The Politics of the Reform of the New Family Law (the Moudawana) 48 (2007); 
F. HARRAK, The History and Significance of the New Moroccan Family Code, 09-002 Working Paper Series of the Institute for 
the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa 1, at 2 (2009), available at: 
www.cics.northwestern.edu/documents/workingpapers/ISITA_09-002_Harrak.pdf [16 November 2012]. 
93 Art. 5 Para. 1 and Art. 12 Moudawana of 1993. 
94 See HARRAK, supra note 92 at 3. 
95 See B. MADDY-WEITZMAN, Women, Islam, and the Moroccan State: The Struggle Over the Personal Status Law, Vol. 59. No. 
3 Middle East Journal 393, at 406 (2005); K. ZOGLIN, Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women, 31 Human 
Rights Quarterly, 964-984, 969 (2009). In contrast to the 1993 revision, the Moudawana of 2004 was not put into force by royal 
decree. King Muhammad IV strove towards a reform of family law that was acceptable to all, thus making parliamentary 
enactment a better basis of legitimation. 
96 Art. 19 Moudawana of 2004. See also BUSKENS, supra note 76 at 114 et seq.; M.-C. FOBLETS & J.-Y. CARLIER, Le Code Maro-
cain de la Famille. Incidences au Regard du Droit International Privé en Europe 25 (2005); NASIR, supra note 18 at 57; HAR-
RAK, supra note 92 at 7. An electronic version of the document is available at: 
http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/Moudawana-English_Translation.pdf [19 August 2011]. 
97 Art. 20 Moudawana of 2004. The marriage authorisation petition must be signed by both the minor and his or her tutor, cf. 
art. 21 Moudawana of 2004. 
98 Art. 12 Para. 4 and Art. 25 Moudawana of 2004. According to Art. 24 a woman still has the right to delegate this power to a 
tutor of her choice. 
99 Art. 16 Para. 1 of the Moudawana of 2004. 
100 Art. 16 Paras. 2 and 3 of the Moudawana of 2004. Cf. also WELCHMAN, supra note 15 at 57. 
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wedlock. As a consequence, they will not be registered in the civil status records, which will 
affect their inheritance and custody rights and may even deny them access to public health care 
and education. Moreover, non-registration of a marriage is effectively tantamount to circum-
vention of protective legal standards such as minimum age restrictions. 
The 2004 revision of the Moudawana has brought about substantial reforms in family law and 
has considerably loosened the law’s previously strict adherence to classical Maliki principles. 
Meanwhile, however, the broad enthusiasm this progressive reform initially earned has now 
largely worn off and its actual implementation has proven far from adequate for a number of 
reasons. First, shortcomings in implementation are closely linked to the central role assigned to 
the judiciary in family-law matters under the revised law. The new legislation leaves questions 
of great social importance to the courts’ discretion. Judges often feel overwhelmed by their lack 
of training and resources in the face of the new expectations placed upon them.101 Some are 
even unwilling to apply the new law correctly, because it is contradictory to their personal 
perceptions of marriage and the family, and it is for this reason that an increasing number of 
judgments are still issued based on classical Maliki law.102 Most notably, judges tend to handle 
the conditions stipulated by article 20 of the 2004 Moudawana far too generously, often grant-
ing approval of under-age marriages in cases where the requirements for such approval are not 
in fact met. Second, deficiences in the implementation of statutory law in this area can also be 
attributed to insufficient awareness of the new legal situation among the public at large, par-
ticularly among the tribal population.103 Third, the inefficacy of the statutory law also stems 
from its insensitivity to specific regional or tribal customs and practices. Since their defining 
purpose is to achieve unification, the new statutory provisions have made little effort to incor-
porate customary practices and rules into official law. This has given rise to feelings that the 
new law does not pay sufficient heed to people’s needs and concerns and has also raised ques-
tions of legitimation, thus widening the gap between statutory and customary law. A good 
example in this regard is the problem of marriage registration. Today, many marital alliances 
are not officially recorded simply because registration is not a prerequisite for the validity of a 
marriage either under classical Islamic law or under customary law. When the new Mou-
dawana came into force in 2004, preventing the non-registration of marriages was considered 
an imperative. Accordingly, the revised code offered a procedure for the retroactive registra-
tion of marriage but limited its applicability to a five-year period commencing on the date on 
which the new law came into force.104 While the code did thus make some attempt take practi-
cal realities into account, it failed to acknowledge the fact that tribal concepts of marriage do 
 
101 See K. ZOGLIN, supra note 95 at 978 et seq. 
102 See K. ZOGLIN, supra note 95 at 978. This is so despite the fact that Art. 400 of the Moudawana allows courts to resort to 
classical Maliki jurisprudence only if a specific question was left unaddressed by the code. 
103 See K. ZOGLIN, supra note 95 at 982 et seq.; International Foundation for Electoral Systems & Institute for Women’s Policy 
Research, The Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa Project. Focus on Morocco. Opinions on the Family Law 
and Gender Quotas, at 2 (2010), available at: 
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Papers/2010/swmena/2010_Morocco_Quotas_and_Family_Law_English.pdf 
[17 August 2011]. 
104 The Preamble of the Moudawana of 2004 enumerates the fundamental points of the reform. Para. Nine of the Preamble 
reads: ‘Protect the child’s right to acknowledgement of paternity in the event the marriage has not been officially registered 
for reasons of force majeure, where the court examines the evidence presented to prove filiation, and establish a five-year 
time limit for settling outstanding cases in this regard to put an end to the suffering endured by children in this situation.’ 
Likewise, Art. 16 Para. 4 Moudawana of 2004 states that during this period of time petitions for recognition of marriages can 
be filed. The procedure was open both to marriages acknowledged by both partners and unilaterally contested marriages. 
For the latter, the Ministry of Justice’s guide to the revised Moudawana stated that for the verification of the contested mar-
riage all kinds of proof were admitted, see WELCHMAN, supra note 15 at 57 et seq. 
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not involve registration. This approach was not well received by the Berber population and, 
despite numerous awareness campaigns conducted by the government and human rights 
NGOs, the deadline for retroactive registration has now expired without bringing about signif-
icant changes to marriage practices in rural areas.105 
In summary, the effectiveness of the Moudawana is impaired by a number of factors which 
also tend to encourage the occurrence of under-age marriages. Currently, it is estimated that 
under-age marriages account, on average, for about ten percent of all marriages concluded in 
Morocco and that in rural areas this percentage is even higher.106 The latest official data were 
collected in a census carried out in 2003/2004. According to these evaluations, approximately 10 
percent of women aged between 15 and 19 were married in 2004.107 7.9 percent of women aged 
25 to 49 and 1.6 percent of women aged 15 to 19 in 2004 were 15 years old at the time of their 
first marriage; 6 percent of women aged 20 to 24 in 2004 had either been married or in informal 
union108 before the age of 18.109 It should however be borne in mind that this census was con-
ducted at the same time as the 2004 Moudawana reforms came into force. It cannot therefore be 
regarded as representative of the current situation and does not, by definition, reflect the prac-
tical changes the reform has since achieved. 
Another complex set of problems can be found in the field of criminal law. As stated above, 
article 475 of the Penal Code ensures impunity for consensual sexual activity with minors if the 
offender later agrees to marry the victim. Although the wording of this provision explicitly 
limits the applicability of this remedy to non-violent sexual activity only, article 475 of the Pe-
nal Code is in fact also being applied in rape cases. In recent years, two such cases have attract-
ed much attention in both the national and international media, since the minor victims in both 
cases committed suicide after being married to their tormentors, a circumstance which at the 
very least leaves room for doubts as to the extent to which the legal requirements for under-age 
marriage are in fact being observed, particularly with regard to such marriages requiring mu-
tual consent by both spouses.110 Dramatic incidents such as these have meant that criminal leg-
islation in this area – which was already controversial - has drawn fervent criticicism from both 
domestic and international human rights activists and become a hotly debated political issue. It 
has not only prompted calls for an alteration of the Penal Code, but was also the motivation for 
the drafting of a new law prohibiting violence against women which is currently awaiting min-
 
105 Cf. K. ZOGLIN, supra note 95 at 982 et seq. (2009). 
106 Cf. H. FASSI-FIHRI, It’s Time for Additional Reforms, in H. Fassi-Fihri & Z. Tahiri (Eds.), Perspectives: Morocco’s Family 
Code, 5 Years Later (2009), available at: www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=25395&lan=en&sp=0 [16 November 
2012]. 
107 Cf. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Marriage Data 2008 on Mari-
tal Status, available at: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WMD2008/Main.html [16 November 2012] (10.7 
percent); Ministère de la Santé, Enquête sur la Population et la Santé Familiale 2003-2004, at 83, available at: 
http://www.measuredhs.com/Publications/Publication-Search.cfm?ctry_id=27&c=Morocco&Country=Morocco&cn=Morocco 
[16 November 2012] (10.5 percent). 
108 According to an explanation given by UNICEF, the term ‘in union’ refers to informally concluded, i.e. non-registered 
marriages. 
109 See Ministère de la Santé, supra note 107 at 83 et seq.; UNICEF Database on Child Marriage which was last updated in 
February 2011, available at: http://www.childinfo.org/marriage_countrydata.php [16 November 2012]. 
110 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 91; A. Maghri, In Morocco, the Rape and Death of an Adolescent Girl Prompts Calls 
for Changes to the Penal Code, available at: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/morocco_62113.html [16 November 2012]; 
http://www.equalitynow.org/take_action/discrimination_in_law_action411 [16 November 2012]. By virtue of public state-
ments, the original allegation of rape had been withdrawn by the victim, which enabled criminal exoneration through con-
sensual marriage under the terms of art. 475 of the Penal Code. 
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isterial review and has not yet been presented to parliament.111 For the time being, however, 
the present provision will remain in force.112  
 
d) CEDAW 
Morocco ratified the CEDAW in 1993, but did not publish the text of the convention in the offi-
cial Moroccan law gazette until 2001.113 At the time of ratification, the government expressed 
reservations with regard to articles 2114, 9115, 15116 and 16 of the convention. These reservations 
made it very clear that the government was unwilling to give precedence to the CEDAW in 
cases where its provisions conflicted with sharia law. Given the significance of the articles in 
question, these reservations effectively deprived Morocco’s ratification of the convention of 
any practical consequences. In December 2008, King Muhammad IV announced the retraction 
of the reservations to the CEDAW and these were then formally withdrawn in April 2012.117 
 
2. Egypt 
 
a) Early codifications of personal status law 
Even after the country’s independence from the British authorities in 1922, Egypt’s legal sys-
tem continued its process of gradual assimilation. The Islamic principles on which it had main-
ly been based were now progressively displaced by a somewhat secular European civil law 
system.118 Personal status law, conversely, remained uncodified until 1920.119  
Previously, towards the end of the nineteenth century, child marriages were quite a common 
and widespread phenomenon, particularly in Egypt’s rural areas. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, increased public awareness of the physical and psychological risks of early marriage 
triggered a wave of statutory efforts to curb the practice.120 The first such attempt was a draft 
bill referred to the legislative assembly in 1914 recommending 16 as the minimum marriagea-
ble age for girls and punishing parents, guardians and husbands for arranging under-age mar-
riages.121 Although this bill was later rejected, it was soon followed by an alteration of the 
Egyptian Penal Code under which the consummation of a marriage with a girl younger than 12 
 
111 See The Human Rights Warrior of 15 March 2012, Amina Filali and Violence Against Women in Morocco, available at: 
http://open.salon.com/blog/the_human_rights_warrior/2012/03/15/amina_the_face_of_violence_against_women_in_morocco 
[16 November 2012].  
112 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 91. 
113 See BUSKENS, supra note 76 at 109; Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc of 15 December 2008, The Withdraw-
al of the Reservations to CEDAW by Morocco, available at: http://www.adfm.ma/spip.php?article695&lang=en [16 Novem-
ber 2012]. 
114 Art. 2 embodies the basic ideas and principles of the CEDAW. 
115 Art. 9 grants a mother the right to transmit her nationality to her child. Morocco has never formally withdrawn this reser-
vation but in 2007 enacted a law allowing for the transmission of nationality from the mother to the child, see BUSKENS, supra 
note 76 at 127. 
116 Art. 15 calls for equality between the sexes and Art. 16 prohibits discrimination relating to marriage and family relations. 
117 Cf. Amnesty International, Annual Report 2012. Morocco/Western Sahara, 24 May 2012, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,ESH,456d621e2,4fbe3923c,0.html [16 November 2012]; BUSKENS, supra note 76 at 
127. 
118 See M. BADRAN, Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt 124 and 181 (1996). See also 
L. ABU-ODEH, Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate, 16 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 145-192, at 146 
(2004) and ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 16 at 47. 
119 See T. MAHMOOD, Statutes of Personal Law in Islamic Countries: History, Texts and Analysis, 2nd Edition 10 (1995). 
120 See B. BARON, The Making and Breaking of Marital Bonds in Modern Egypt, in N. R. Keddie & B. Baron (Eds.), Women in 
Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender 275-291, 281 (1991). 
121 See A. THOMPSON, The Woman Question in Egypt, Vol. 4 No. 3 Moslem World 266-272, 266 (1914). 
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years old was classified as rape.122 Under this new provision the validity of the marriage as 
such was not affected by the crime of rape, however.123  
Between 1920 and 1931 a series of personal status laws was passed. While, in purely formal 
terms, the new laws had much in common with European laws in this area, they embodied 
rules mostly derived from the Islamic principles of the Hanafi school of thought.124 To some 
extent, however, the new legislation also had the effect of reforming the Islamic legal frame-
work from within inasfar as it also drew on a number of rulings from other schools of Islamic 
law or combined them with Hanafi interpretations.125 In cases where there was no applicable 
statutory law, courts were instructed to apply the Hanafi doctrine.126  
The two main problems addressed by the new legislation were child marriages and non-
registration of marriage. Child marriages were counteracted by denying court access to mar-
riage-related claims in cases where the marriage had been concluded with a female below 16 or 
a male below 18 years of age.127 Accordingly, civil registry offices were also urged not to regis-
ter marriages involving under-age spouses.128 Claims arising from unregistered, so-called ‘urfi 
marriages were likewise denied a judicial hearing except in cases where the marriage was not 
contested by any of the parties concerned.129 
Remarkably, as a concession to classical Hanafi opinion, the legal validity of marriages con-
cluded in violation of age or registration requirements was left unchallenged by the legisla-
tors.130 This opened the door for severe abuses such as depriving spouses of their matrimonial 
rights or alleging non-existant claims.131 
A new law passed in 1931 reaffirmed the legislative steps taken with regard to child marriages 
and non-registration of marriage in the foregoing decade. The age requirements for marriage 
were maintained, though the relevant point in time for determining the spouses’ ages was 
shifted from the time of the conclusion of the marriage to the time of the court hearing.132 Un-
registered marriages also remained outside the courts’ jurisdiction, since official documents 
were deemed to be the only authoritative documentary evidence of marriage.133 Furthermore, 
 
122 Cf. A. C. MCBARNET, The New Penal Code: Offenses against the Morality and the Marriage Tie and Children, Vol. 10 No. 
46 L’Egypte Contemporaine, 382-386 (1919) as cited by B. BARON, supra note 120 at 281. 
123 See SHAHAM, supra note 18 at 54. 
124 See M. BADRAN, Competing Agenda: Feminism, Islam and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Egypt, in 
D. Kandiyoti (Ed.), Women, Islam and the State 201, at 201 (1991); M. F. HATEM, Secularist and Islamist Discourses on Mo-
dernity in Egypt and the Evolution of the Postcolonial Nation-State, in Y. Yazbeck Haddad & J. L. Esposito (Eds.), Islam, 
Gender, and Social Change 85, at 89 (1998); ABU-ODEH, supra note 39 at 1101 et seq.; ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 16 
at 47. 
125 So-called doctrine of supra-madhab, see ABU-ODEH, supra note 39 at 1091; R. SHAHAM, Custom, Islamic Law, and Statuto-
ry Legislation: Marriage Registration and Minimum Age at Marriage in the Egyptian Shari'a Courts, Vol. 2 No. 3 Journal of 
Islamic Law and Society, 258-281, 260 (1995). 
126 Art. 280 Law No. 78 of 1931. See M. BERGER & N. SONNEVELD, Sharia and National Law in Egypt, in J. M. Otto (Ed.), Sharia 
Incorporated. A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present 51, at 74 
(2010) and M. BERGER, Secularizing Interreligious Law in Egypt, Vol. 12 No. 3 Journal of Islamic Law and Society, 394-418, at 
397, 410 (2005). 
127 Art. 1 Law No. 56 of 1923. Cf. EL ALAMI, supra note 29 at 198 et seq.; BARON, supra note 120 at 281. 
128 See ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 16 at 50; BARON, supra note 120 at 281 et seq.; WELCHMAN, supra note 15 at 62. 
129 Art. 1 Law No. 56 of 1923. See BÜCHLER, supra note 20 at 27 et seq.; SHAHAM, supra note 125 at 266. 
130 Cf. SHAHAM, supra note 125 at 264, 266. 
131 See for instance the examples given by SHAHAM, supra note 18 at 57 et seq. 
132 Art. 99 Para. 5 and Art. 367 Law No. 78 of 1931 and Art. 33 Regulations for Marriage Officials issued in accordance with 
Law No. 78 of 1931. Cf. SHAHAM, supra note 125 at 263; E. FAWZY, supra note 1 at 42 et seq. 
133 Art. 99 Law No. 78 of 1931. Cf. WELCHMAN, supra note 15 at 56. 
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under the 1931 legislation, the guardian’s consent, as required by classical Hanafi doctrine, was 
not defined as a precondition for the validity of a marriage contract.134 
With regard to its reception by the judiciary, the new legislation was supported by the majority 
of judges while a minority pursued a very narrow interpretation of the new provisions in order 
to limit their scope of application.135 In practical terms, however, implementation of these re-
forms proved to be a very cumbersome endeavour, since it was not uncommon for birth certifi-
cates either not to exist or to be forged and because the new laws were resisted by large 
swathes of the population. Furthermore, registry office officials frequently took advantage of 
the fact that infringements of the new law were rarely prosecuted and simply refused to com-
ply with the new standards.136 
 
b) Recent reforms 
The legal framework established by the 1931 legislation regulating under-age marriages and 
marriage registration endured for a long time. Family law was not included in the national 
Civil Code that came into force in 1948.137 Similarly, in 1971, although calls for an increase in 
the marriageable age to 18 years for girls and 21 years for boys were put forward for discussion 
when Egypt’s new constitution was being drafted, these proposed changes were not in fact 
included in the final draft.138 
It was only as recently as 2000 that marriage registration again became the focus of public at-
tention – in the context of a far-reaching set of reforms to Egyptian divorce law.139 In many re-
spects the new law resembles its predecessor, particularly since it also denies court access to 
claims arising from unregistered marriages. However, the most important discrepancy be-
tween the new law and its 1931 predecessor lies in the fact that the new law allows for the judi-
cial admissibility of divorce claims relating to unregistered marriages, provided that there is 
some sort of documentation of the marriage having occurred.140 Although there were fears that 
this partial legitimisation of ‘urfi marriages would encourage secret marriages and the circum-
vention of the law,141 legislators opted for their limited recognition because their previous judi-
cial exclusion had, in practice, been a cause of major iniquities.142 In addition to its provisions 
regarding registration of marriage, the new law also reconfirmed the minimum marriageable 
ages of 16 years for females and 18 years for males originally set in 1931.143 With the exception 
of the minimum marriageable age for females which, as a result of a more recent reform enact-
 
134 For an extensive discussion see EL ALAMI, supra note 29 passim. 
135 See SHAHAM, supra note 125 at 276. 
136 See SHAHAM, supra note 125 at 275; MOUSSA J., Competing Fundamentalisms and Egyptian Women’s Family Rights. 
International Law and the Reform of Shari’a-derived Legislation, 166 (2011). 
137 The Civil Code was drafted under the leadership of the nationalist secular movement. At first, the drafters intended to 
include a section on personal status law in the code in order to reconcile religious tradition and reformist progress, but the 
project was eventually dropped, see ABU-ODEH, supra note 39 at 1097 et seq. 
138 See ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 16 at 58. 
139 Law No. 1 of 2000. 
140 Art. 17 Para. 2 Law No. 1 of 2000, see FAWZY, supra note 1 at 69; MOUSSA, supra note 136, at 168. 
141 See FAWZY, supra note 1 at 72; SONNEVELD N., Rethinking the Difference between Formal and Informal Marriages in 
Egypt, in M. Voorhoeve (Ed.), Family Law in Islam. Divorce, marriage and Women in the Muslim World, 77 et seq., at 79 et 
seq. (2012). 
142 See the example given by FAWZY, supra note 1 at 42: If under the 1931 law a woman entered a non-registered marriage, 
she was not allowed to marry another man. However, due to lack of registration she would not be heard by the court if she 
wanted to obtain a judicial divorce, even in the event that her husband officially married another woman. She was thus 
trapped in the marriage. Cf. also MOUSSA, supra note 136, at 166, 168. 
143 Art. 17 Law No. 1 of 2000. Marriages involving minors were nevertheless considered valid, cf. FAWZY, supra note 1 at 69. 
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ed in 2008,144 was raised to 18 years, the 2000 regulations remain in force and have recently 
been complemented by a ministerial decree limiting the age gap between spouses to a maxi-
mum of 25 years.145 The 2008 reform also led to a tightening of penal law which makes it a 
criminal offence for both guardians and registry office officials to allow under-age marriages to 
take place.146 Very recently, however, it has been rumoured that the Egyptian parliament is 
considering debating a reduction of the marriageable age for girls from 18 to 14 or possibly 
even nine years. While these rumours have raised deep concerns among human rights activ-
ists, they have not yet been officially confirmed by the government.147 
Another problem closely entwined with under-age marriages and one which has been ad-
dressed by legislators both in 2008 and 2010 is the issue of human trafficking. Egypt is com-
monly reputed to be a source, transit and destination country for women and children who 
have fallen victim to forced labour and sex trafficking.148 A common phenomenon in this re-
gard is that of so-called summer marriages, i.e. temporary, commercial marriages which serve 
to legitimise sexual relations for a certain period of time, which have been heavily criticised by 
human rights activists and widely reported in the international media.149 Such alliances - which 
essentially lack a basis in classical Hanafi doctrine - often involve minors, typically girls, and 
are generally concluded out of financial need. They are usually facilitated by the minor’s par-
ents in exchange for a commission, and occasionally rely on the aid of professional marriage 
intermediaries. Such arrangements not only expose the minor to sexual exploitation, but also to 
forced labour, as the child victims are sometimes taken back to the husband’s home state to 
work as domestic servants.150 The legislature has taken several steps to prevent this practice, 
including a tightening of the Child Law151, alterations to the Penal Code152 and the adoption of 
a comprehensive law against human trafficking in 2012153. Furthermore, in 2010, the govern-
ment established a National Plan of Action to combat human trafficking, whose measures in-
cluded the establishment of a national victim referral mechanism.154 According to human rights 
 
144 Art. 31bis Law No 143 of 1994 as stipulated by Law No. 126 of 2008. 
145 Cf. F. HARRISON, Egypt Bans 92-Year-Old's Marriage, BBC News of 13 June 2008, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7452456.stm [16 November 2012]. 
146 See MOUSSA, supra note 136, at 167, footnote 7, referring to the corresponding alterations of the Child Act (Law No. 12 of 
1996) and the Penal Code (Law No. 58 of 1937).  
147 See http://www.equalitynow.org/take_action/child_marriage_action [16 November 2012]; 
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/egypt-new-child-marriage-laws-are-a-step-backwards [16 November 2012]; 
http://plan-international.org/about-plan/resources/news/egypt-new-child-marriage-laws-threaten-girls/ [16 November 2012]. 
148 See United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report – Egypt, 14 June 2010, 146, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c1883f8c.html [16 November 2012]. 
149 Cf. for instance http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2173796/Rich-Arab-tourists-buying-age-brides-Egypt-just-
summer-3-200.html [16 November 2012]; VESELINOVIC M., Scandal of ‘Summer Brides’, The Independent, 15 July 2012, avail-
able at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/scandal-of-summer-brides-7944467.html [16 November 2012]. 
150 See VESELINOVIC, supra note 149. 
151 Law No. 12 of 1996, as amended by Law No. 126 of 2008. An electronic version of the document is available at: 
http://www.nccm-egypt.org/e7/e2498/e2691/infoboxContent2692/ChildLawno126english_eng.pdf [16 November 2012]. Cf. 
for instance the right of a child to protection from all forms of violence, or injury, or physical, mental or sexual abuse as 
enshrined in art. 3 sec. 1 lit. a.  
152 See art. 291 of the Penal Code, Law No. 58 of 1937, added in accordance with Law No. 126 of 2008, which amongst other 
things criminalises the violation of the right of a child to protection from trafficking or from sexual, commercial or economic 
exploitation. An electronic version of the article is available at: http://www.nccm-
egypt.org/e7/e2498/e2691/infoboxContent2692/ChildLawno126english_eng.pdf [16 November 2012].  
153 Law No. 64 of 2012 regarding Combating Human Trafficking. An electronic version of the document is available at: 
http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Egypt_TIP-Law_2010-Ar+En.pdf [16 November 2012]. 
154 See United States State Department, supra note 148 at 146. 
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activists, however, these legislative measures have yet to be sufficiently and effectively imple-
mented and summer marriages thus remain a problem.155 
The most recent surveys, carried out in 2008, indicate that 17 percent of all women in Egypt 
aged 20 to 24 at that time had been married or in union156 before the age of 18 and that this per-
centage is almost twice as high in rural areas as it is in towns and cities.157 The proportion of 
women aged 15 to 19 who were married in 2008 amounted to 13.1 percent.158 7.4 percent of 
women aged 25 to 49 in 2008 had been first married at the age of 15 and 1.1 percent of women 
aged 15 to 19 in that same year were married by the time they were 15.159 It is also important to 
note that these statistics do not include either ‘urfi marriages – which are reportedly showing a 
continuing upward trend160 – or temporary marriages. From this it is clear that under-age mar-
riages are still a widespread phenomenon in Egypt and that, despite a trend towards spouses 
being older when they first marry, actual implementation of the statutory law is not yet guar-
anteed throughout the country. Law enforcement is often frustrated by the falsification of birth 
certificates and corruption, despite noticeable efforts by the government to intensify its imple-
mentation of these laws, particularly with regard to criminal prosecution.161 Another element 
of uncertainty in this area stems from the previously mentioned ongoing rumours of a possible 
significant reduction of the minimum marriageable age, though these have not yet been cor-
roborated by the official authorities. 
 
c) CEDAW 
Egypt ratified the CEDAW in 1981, recording reservations with regard to articles 2, 9, 16 and 
29162. The reservations to articles 2 and 16 were the only ones explicitly based on the state’s 
commitment to the sharia.163 Until powerful mass demonstrations forced a change of govern-
ment in February 2011, this commitment to the sharia had been enshrined in article 2 of the 
Constitution of 1971, which declared the principles of Islamic jurisprudence to be the principal 
source of legislation.164 In its ongoing jurisdiction, the Supreme Constitutional Court has al-
ways interpreted this provision as meaning that the sole matters which the legislature had no 
right to regulate were those on which ijtihad was prohibited.165 Consequently, apart from the 
core principles of Islam, Egyptian legislators have been free to regulate based on their autono-
 
155 See United States State Department, supra note 148 at 147. 
156 Cf. supra note 108. 
157 See UNICEF Database on Child Marriage, supra note 109; cf. also MOUSSA, supra note 136, at 167, footnote 10 with further 
information. 
158 See F. EL-ZANATY & A. WAY, Egypt Demographic Health Survey 2008 97, available at: 
http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR220/FR220.pdf [16 November 2012]. 
159 Cf. EL-ZANATY & WAY, supra note 158 at 99. 
160 See Institute of National Planning, Egypt/United Nations Development Programme, Egypt Human Development Report 
2010. Youth in Egypt: Building Our Future, 3 (2010), available at: 
http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/NHDR%202010%20english.pdf [16 November 2012]. 
161 See MOUSSA, supra note 136, at 167. 
162 Art. 29 offers the possibility of arbitration for disputes between state parties to the convention. 
163 Paradoxically, Egypt has not made reservations to other provisions of the CEDAW such as Arts. 1 (discrimination in 
general) or 11 (discrimination in employment) which also conflict with the sharia. According to AN-NA’IM this is because in 
Egypt family-law matters as dealt with in Art. 16 of the convention are based on the sharia whereas nearly all other aspects 
of law have been modified through state legislation, cf. A. A. AN-NA’IM, The Rights of Women and International Law in the 
Muslim Context, 9 Whittier Law Review 491-516, at 513 (1987). 
164 Cf. the Constitution of 1971 as amended in 1980. An electronic version of the document is available at: 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/en/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=208 [16 November 2012]. 
165 See C. B. LOMBARDI, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization of the Shariah in a 
Modern Arab State, Vol. 37 No. 1 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 81-124, 99 et seq. (1998/1999); A. BÜCHLER, Kinder-
rechte und Kindesschutz in Ägypten. Die jüngsten Reformen, 4 FamPra.ch 833-841, 835 et seq. (2008). 
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mous interpretation of the religious sources and without reliance on a specific scholarly exege-
sis.166 Thanks to this relatively liberal understanding of the 1971 Constitution, the reservations 
to the CEDAW did not present a major obstacle to an effective implementation of the conven-
tion. In April 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which had been in 
charge since the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, adopted an Interim Constitutional 
Declaration. The wording of article 2 of this Declaration was almost identical to that of article 2 
of the 1971 Constitution and declared the principles of Islamic jurisprudence to be the main 
source of legislation.167 The similarity between the two provisions suggested that the interpre-
tation which the Supreme Constitutional Court has adopted hitherto was likely to continue. 
This situation changed, however, when the new constitution adopted by the Constituent As-
sembly came into force on 26 December 2012. It provides for a different distribution of inter-
pretational sovereignty, declaring the principles of sharia to be the main source of legislation 
(Article 2), while at the same time vesting the power to interpret the sharia in the Al-Azhar, a 
prominent religious schooling institution (Article 4).168 Human rights activists disapprove of 
this delegation of interpretational powers on the grounds that it would enable an unelected 
body to decide, without judicial review, on matters which are crucial to the future of human 
rights in Egypt.169 Bearing in mind the relatively conservative orientation of the Al-Azhar, there 
would appear to be only a very scant possibility that the previous liberal interpretation of the 
CEDAW reservations will continue to hold sway. 
 
3. Saudi Arabia 
 
a) Supremacy of Islamic law 
Unlike Morocco or Egypt, Saudi Arabia has never been subject to colonial rule. Its legal system 
has developed indigenously and has essentially remained unaffected by European influences. 
Instead, familial and tribal relations form the basis on which the state is founded and its core 
principles are purely religious in their origin.170 The strong bond between the state and Islam 
was perhaps most tellingly expressed in a royal decree enacted in 1992 which declared the 
Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet to be the Saudi Arabian constitution.171 Given the suprem-
acy of the sharia over every man-made law, the scope for state legislation is thus considerably 
limited.172 Accordingly, for the most part, Saudi Arabian law is classical Islamic law, and this is 
 
166 See O. ARABI, The Dawning of the Third Millennium on Shari‘a: Egypt’s Law no. 1 of 2000, or Women May Divorce at 
Will, Vol. 16 No. 1 Arab Law Quarterly 2-21, 8 et seq., 19 et seq. (2001). 
167 An electronic version of the Interim Declaration is available at: 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/en/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=1155 [16 November 2012]. 
168 See the description given by Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Fix Draft Constitution to protect Key Rights, 8 October 2012, 
available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/08/egypt-fix-draft-constitution-protect-key-rights [16 November 2012]. 
169 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 168; Human Rights Watch, Letter to Members of the Egyptian Constituent Assem-
bly, 8 October 2012, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/08/letter-members-egyptian-constituent-assembly [16 
November 2012]. 
170 Cf. A. AL-YASSINI, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 83 (1985); M. FANDY, Religion, Social Structure and 
Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia, in A. Hourani & P. Khoury & M. C. Wilson, The Modern Middle East: A Reader, 2nd Edi-
tion 657, at 665 (2005); M. Q. ZAMAN, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam. Custodians of Change xiv (2002). 
171 Art. 1 of the Basic Law. The Basic Law (Royal Decree No. A/90 of 1 March 1992) regulates the structure of government, the 
state’s organisation and the rights of individuals. A printed version of the decree can be found in Saudi Arabia: The New 
Constitution: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 8 No. 3 Arab Law Quarterly 258-270 (1993). 
172 According to A. M. AL-JARBOU, Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 19 No. 1 Arab Law Quarterly 5-
54, at 14, footnote 31 (2004), state regulation is possible only (1) if the quran and the sunna remain silent on a matter, (2) if the 
rules of the Quran and the Sunna on a matter are of a very general nature, or (3) if there are different valid interpretations as 
to a certain provision of the quran and the sunna. Thus, in the context of Saudi Arabia, state legislation means supplemen-
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especially true of family law, since its rules as elaborated by classical Islamic jurisprudence are 
deemed to be exhaustive.173 This immobile state of affairs has completely paralysed family-law 
reform. It reflects the views of the conservative scholars, the ulama, who enjoy enormous politi-
cal power174, despite the clear power structure laid down in the Basic Law – which designates 
the King as the head of state who derives his authority directly from the holy sources of Islamic 
law and is thus not in fact subject to the control of any other state authority.175  
Islamic law and jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia are dominated by the Hanbali school of 
thought, which is, in many respects, the strictest of the four Sunni schools,176 and the official 
Saudi Arabian state doctrine is Wahhabism.177 Wahhabites are an extremely conservative sect 
whose main points of view are largely modelled in accordance with Hanbali teaching.178 Like 
the Hanbali school of thought, Wahhabism does not recognise non-textual sources of Islamic 
law, and personal reasoning or rationalist methods of interpretation of religious sources are 
therefore not permitted.179 Wahhabites espouse a very traditional lifestyle, especially with re-
gard to family law, and, at least to some extent, even adhere to puritanical pre-Islamic practic-
es.180 The resultant adverse consequences for women are justified by the different roles ascribed 
to the two sexes in Islam.181 
  
                                                                                                                                                                         
tary legislation and it is mainly to be found in sectors such as administrative, labour and commercial law since these are the 
areas of law where the sharia leaves more room for interpretation, cf. J. LEITES, Modernist Jurisprudence as a Vehicle for 
Gender Role Reform in the Islamic World, 22 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 251-330, at 283 (1990/1991); N. ABIAD, 
Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Comparative Study, 144 et seq. (2008); cf. also J. 
SCHACHT, Islamic Law in Contemporary States, Vol. 8 No. 2 American Journal of Comparative Law 133-147, at 136 et seq. 
(1959). For more details see F. E. VOGEL, Saudi Arabia: Public, Civil and Individual Shari’a, in R. W. Hefner, Islamic Law and 
Society in the Modern World, 55-93, 55 et seq. (2011). 
173 See VOGEL, supra note 172 at 84; LEITES, supra note 172 at 284; G. N. SFEIR, The Saudi Approach to Law Reform, Vol. 36 
No. 4 American Journal of Comparative Law 729-759, at 756 (1988). 
174 One famous example for such a conflict between the monarch and the ulama is the controversial ban on female drivers. It 
is well known that the king would be willing to allow women to drive but due to the ulama’s resistance he refrained from 
lifting the prohibition, see VOGEL, supra note 172 at 59, 82 et seq. The ban is an ongoing issue in Saudi Arabia, cf. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13809684 [16 Nomber 2012]; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7000499.stm [16 
November 2012]. 
175 Arts. 7 and 70 of the Basic Law. See AL-JARBOU, supra note 172 at 19. 
176 See LEITES, supra note 172 at 282; Schacht, supra note 172 at 136; S. SHAMMA, Law and Lawyers in Saudi Arabia, Vol. 14 
No. 3 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1034-1039, 1034 (1965). 
177 The strong link between Wahhabism and the Saudi Arabian state is the result of a historic alliance of the current royal 
family, the house of Saud, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi sect, back in the eighteenth 
century. At that time, King Ibn Saud was trying to ensure his supremacy over the Arabian Peninsula and invited al-Wahab to 
provide for a Wahhabist interpretation of the law in exchange for religious legitimisation of his claim to power. Cf. for ex-
ample AL-JARBOU, supra note 172 at 19. 
178 See LEITES, supra note 172 at 282. 
179 See VOGEL, supra note 172 at 55 et seq.; H. CHAPIN METZ, Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress, 5th Edition 82 (1993); A. SAEED, Islamic Thought. An Introduction, 52 (2006).; H. ESMAEILI, On a Slow 
Boat Towards the Rule of Law: The Nature of Law in the Saudi Arabian Legal System, Vol. 26 No. 1 Arizona Journal of In-
ternational & Comparative Law 10-47, at 14 (2009). 
180 See LEITES, supra note 172 at 282. For more information on Wahhabism see W. OCHSENWALD, Saudi Arabia and the Islamic 
Revival, Vol. 13 No. 3 International Journal of Middle East Studies 271-286, at 283 (1981) 
181 See the Combined Initial and Second Periodic Report of Saudi Arabia under Article 18 of the CEDAW submitted on 29 
March 2007, CEDAW/C/SAU/2, at 10 et seq.; E. A. DOUMATO, Saudi Arabia, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North 
Africa, Freedom House Special Report, 17, footnote 2, 34 (2009). 
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b) Minimum age for marriage 
As outlined above, personal status and family law have not been codified in Saudi Arabia. The 
authoritative rules are the ones laid down in the Quran and the Sunna, as interpreted by the 
Hanbali school of law and Wahhabite ideology. Thus, minors lack the legal capacity to enter 
into marriage on their own. Physical evidence of the onset of puberty brings that incapacity to 
an end, provided that there are no mental deficiencies requiring further guardianship.182 If the 
physical signs fail to appear, the Hanbali school assumes that puberty is attained by both sexes 
at the age of 15 years.183 Furthermore, the consent to marriage by a woman who has attained 
legal capacity must be expressed by her guardian since she cannot conclude a marriage con-
tract on her own,184 although the consent of the woman is an indispensable prerequisite for the 
validity of the marriage.185 
A minor can be married off by the guardian before reaching puberty, provided that consum-
mation of the marriage is put off until puberty. The Hanbali school also recognises the right of 
a child spouse to terminate the marriage upon reaching puberty and before consummation. In 
practice, however, this right is hard to exercise, especially for girls since they usually cannot 
return to their parents’ home after ending their betrothal. The formation of a marriage contract 
on behalf of a minor, even if it takes place shortly after birth, is not in and of itself regarded as 
immoral. Opinions appear to differ, however, as far as the appropriate time for the consumma-
tion of the marriage is concerned. Human rights groups as well as the state-run Human Rights 
Commission object that marriages are frequently consummated at too early an age. Medical 
practitioners oppose this practice by refusing to carry out the mandatory premarital tests if the 
future spouses are still very young.186 Religious authorities, conversely, usually sanction the 
early consummation of marriage.187  
To date, it can be said that the practice of marrying off children in order to clear debts or to 
ensure property rights is commonly accepted in Saudi Arabia, though it should be noted that 
reliable data on this are virtually non-existent. The most recent available statistics indicate that 
3.9 percent of women aged 15 to 19 in 2007 were married.188 The latest national demographic 
research, carried out in 2007, shows that 0.1 percent of these women were married at 15, 0.2 
percent at 16, 0.2 percent at 17 and 0.2 percent at 18 years.189 The number of women who were 
married at the age of 19 (3.2 percent) is significantly higher, at 3.2 percent. This indicates a 
 
182 Cf. ZAHRAA, supra note 25 at 251 et seq. 
183 Cf. BAKHTIAR, supra note 23 at 403; Zahraa, supra note 25 at 250, footnote 37. 
184 Cf. KHAN & KHAN, supra note 28 at 60. 
185 According to a circular issued by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, courts and marriage registration officials need to 
secure the consent of the woman to the marriage (Decree No. 109 of 5 Jumada I 1391 AH). Mandatory registration of mar-
riages is part of the state’s authority to regulate administrative matters. 
186 See www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/CultureAndMedia/?id=3.0.2865409658 [16 November 2012]. According to Royal 
Decree No. 5 of 18 March 2002 concerning the health regulations applicable to all Saudis wishing to marry, the future spous-
es have to undergo medical testing in order to obtain a marriage certificate. In 2008 the list of obligatory tests for several 
defined genetic or blood diseases was extended to tests for HIV/AIDS and certain forms of hepatitis. 
187 As mentioned above, the most significant argument put forward by the religious scholars is the marriage of Prophet Mu-
hammad to the seven-year-old Aisha. Based on this tradition they deem girls much younger than fifteen years old mature 
enough for the consummation of marriage, cf. Y. ADMON, Rising Criticism of Child Bride Marriages in Saudi Arabia, The 
Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 502 of 8 March 2009 with references therein, 
available at http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3216.htm [16 November 2012]. Nevertheless, the practice of marry-
ing young girls to elderly men partly also encounters resistance from clerics, cf. 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/08/248411.html [16 November 2012]. 
188 See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, supra note 107. 
189 Cf. Demographic Research Bulletin 1428H (2007), Table 20-2, available at: 
http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=77&Itemid=113 [16 November 2012]. 
These percentages were derived from the absolute figures contained in this table and rounded to one decimal place. 
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slight tendency towards a higher marriage age, albeit one which is not explained by the legal 
situation. The data for all women in 2007 who had ever been married show that around 8.3 
percent had been married at the age of 15, 8.9 percent at the age of 16, 10.1 percent at the age of 
17 and 9.2 percent at the age of 18.190  
In recent years, child marriages, in particular constellations of very young girls wedded to el-
derly men, were often reported in the international and Saudi Arabian media.191 Interestingly, 
there were several cases brought before Saudi Arabian sharia courts in which the state-run 
Human Rights Commission either actively tried to stop these marriages or to delay their con-
summation.192 This commission is currently also carrying out research into the consequences of 
child marriages and plans, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, to prepare proposals for 
establishing a legal minimum age for marriage.193 International pressure on the Saudi Arabian 
legislature was also exerted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which recommended 
setting the age of legal majority as well as the marriageable age at 18 years for both sexes.194 In 
January 2011, the Saudi Arabian parliament passed a draft bill for a new child protection law. 
The aim of this draft legislation is to improve the protection afforded to children in a number 
of instances, including cases of negligence, trafficking and physical or mental abuse. In accord-
ance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this new draft legislation also fixes the 
age of legal majority at 18 years for both sexes. However, in order to avoid a controversy with 
the ulama, the issue of a minimum age for marriage was carefully excluded from the debate.195 
In the light of the restraint exercised both by the King and by government officials with regard 
to family law, it appears highly unlikely that a minimum statutory age for marriage will be 
introduced in the near or indeed even the distant future.196 
  
 
190 Cf. Demographic Research Bulletin 1428H (2007), supra note 189 Table 21-2. These percentages were derived from the 
absolute figures contained in this table and rounded to one decimal place 
191 By way of example see the overview given by ADMON, supra note 187; http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/saudi-
arabia/090416/child-marriage-case-showcases-deep-splits-saudi-society [16 November 2012]; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7579616.stm [16 November 2012]; 
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3216.htm [16 November 2012]. 
192 See for instance SAMBRIDGE A., Saudi ‘Eyes Minimum Age for Marriage’, ArabianBusiness.com, 20 January 2009, available 
at: http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-eyes-minimum-age-for-marriage--81147.html [16 November 2012]. 
193 Cf. BRINKLEY J., Child Marriage Still an Issue in Saudi Arabia, San Francisco Chronicle, 14 March 2012, available at: 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/brinkley/article/Child-marriage-still-an-issue-in-Saudi-Arabia-3270366.php [16 November 
2012]; D. E. MILLER, Saudi Arabia Inches Closer to Ban on Child Marriages, The Jerusalem Post, 9 March 2011, available at: 
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=211404 [16 November 2012]; 
http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/saudi-approves-child-protection-law-2011-01-18-1.343828; H. TOMLINSON, 12-
Year-Old Bride’s Divorce Prompts Marriage Age Review in Saudi Arabia, The Sunday Times, 22 April 2010, available at: 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7104248.ece [16 November 2012]; 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/08/248411.html [16 November 2012]. However, the efforts of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs which had conducted earlier studies in this vein and submitted them to parliament in order to prepare for a 
statutory minimum age for marriage did not succeed. 
194 CRC/C/SAU/CO/2 of 17 March 2006, 6, No. 26. 
195 See MILLER, supra note 193. However, several members of parliament seem to argue in favour of minimum age legislation, 
cf. KAWACH N., Emirates 24/7, 2 June 2011, available at: http://www.emirates247.com/news/child-marriage-is-murder-of-
innocence-2011-06-02-1.400336 [16 November 2012]. 
196 In 2010 for example the Ministry of Interior introduced new standard marriage contracts which require marriage registra-
tion officials to record the age of the bride. The main idea behind this was to turn the officials’ attention to the problem of 
child marriages and at least establish some kind of social, yet not legal control. Cf. also BRINKLEY, supra note 193, passim. 
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c) CEDAW 
Saudi Arabia became a signatory to the CEDAW in 2000.197 As was the case with other Muslim 
signatory states, ratification was subject to a very general reservation stating that, in cases of 
conflict between the convention and the sharia, Saudi Arabia would not be bound by the for-
mer.198 Given that, as explained previously, classical Islamic law in Saudi Arabia still prevails 
in a very primordial, literal form, it is easily conceivable that the convention’s progressive pro-
visions will not fully come into effect. That indeed was also the conclusion reached by both the 
initial and second reports to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women199.200  
 
4. Iran 
 
a) Marriageable age under the regime of the Shah 
Following a coup d’état, Iran became a constitutional monarchy under the reign of Reza Shah 
Pahlavi in 1925. Dedicated to establishing a secular, central legal system, the Shah’s receptive-
ness towards Western concepts was reflected in the legislation promulgated at that time, de-
spite the fact that Iran, like Saudi Arabia, had never been subjected to colonial rule.201 The Shah 
initiated a large-scale process of codification which also led to the promulgation of a law on 
marriage in 1931202 and of the Iranian Civil Code in 1935.203 The Civil Code was partly inspired 
by European models. However, in the field of personal status and family law, the reforms to 
previous Iranian law were kept within narrow bounds, and the rules codified in the Civil Code 
mainly corresponded to classical Islamic law as interpreted by the Shia doctrine.204 
Notwithstanding the clear commitment to Shia Islam, a few provisions of the new legislation, 
including some related to marriageable age, deviated slightly from the traditional Jafari teach-
ings.205 Most notably, marriages of girls younger than 15 or boys younger than 18 years of age 
were forbidden as a matter of principle.206 Power was bestowed on the courts to authorise mar-
riages by spouses below these age limits with their guardians’ approval and on condition that 
the marriage was justified by ’proper reasons‘, provided the female spouse was aged at least 13 
 
197 Royal Decree No. 25 of 28 August 2000. 
198 See L. A. KHAN, The Qur’an and the Constitution, 85 Tulane Law Review 161, at 187 (2010). In addition to the general 
reservation Saudi Arabia also made an explicit reservation to Art. 9 Para. 2 and Art. 29 Para. 1 of the convention. 
199 CEDAW/C/SAU/2 submitted on 29 March 2007. Cf. the obligation of the state parties under Art. 18 of the CEDAW. 
200 See for instance the critique expressed by KRIVENKO, supra note 29 at 168 et seq.; CEDAW/C/SAU/2, at 47 et seq. Altogeth-
er it becomes very clear that the protective effect of the CEDAW in Saudi Arabia is limited. 
201 Thus, the French Civil Code for example served as a model for several provisions, cf. Z. MIR-HOSSEINI, How the Door of 
Ijtihad Was Opened and Closed: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Family Law Reforms in Iran and Morocco, 64 Washing-
ton & Lee Law Review 1499, at 1502, footnote 9 with references (2007). 
202 Marriage Act of 1931, amended in 1937. 
203 See S. A. ARJOMAND, History, Structure, and Revolution in the Shi’ite Tradition in Contemporary Iran, Vol. 10 No. 2 Inter-
national Political Science Review 111-119, at 115 et seq. (1989); H. SEDGHI, Women and Politics in Iran. Veiling, Unveiling and 
Reveiling, 65 (2007). These political reforms increasingly weakened the position of religious scholars and tribal authorities, cf. 
Y. ERTÜRK, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences of 27 January 2006, 
E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.3 at 5. 
204 See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 201, at 1503; MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 16 at 33. Art. 12 of the Constitution of 1906 declared 
Twelver Shiism the official state doctrine of Iran, while some other schools of law enjoyed full recognition when it came to 
the performance of religious rituals. One of the typical Shia elements comprised in the code was the recognition of temporary 
marriage, see Art. 1075 of the Civil Code of 1935; MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 16 at 24; A. E. GRAVES, Women in Iran: Obstacles 
to Human Rights and Possible Solutions, 5 American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 57-92, at 63, 
footnote 29 (1996/1997). 
205 Cf. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 16 at 24. 
206 Art. 1041 of the Civil Code of 1935. 
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and the male spouse was at least 15 years old.207 This meant that marrying off girls below 15 
years of age without judicial permission was declared a punishable offence.208 In order to estab-
lish state control over marriage and divorce, the registration of such events became mandato-
ry.209 Failure to register a marriage or notify a divorce made both the husband and the registry 
office official participating in the marriage proceedings liable to punishment.210  
The age limitations set by the Civil Code and the Marriage Act were considerably higher than 
those advocated by the Jafari school, which defines marriageable age as nine for females and 15 
for males.211 The Shah’s legislation in fact proved to be mainly beneficial to women of higher 
social class, since the age requirements set out by the new law were hardly observed in rural 
regions.212 Furthermore, the courts, despite taking the new legislative provisions into account, 
did not in fact succeed in significantly reducing child marriages, because exceptions under 
article 1041 of the Civil Code were granted too permissively.213 
In 1967, the primacy of classical Islamic law with regard to matters of personal status was sub-
stantially curtailed when a new Family Protection Law, subsequently revised in 1975, came 
into force. The new law was commonly seen as one of the most liberal family laws in the Mid-
dle East. While not directly challenging the intrinsically religious nature of the pre-existing 
law, the new law introduced a number of changes, most of which were purely formalistic in 
nature.214 The practical effect of the registration requirement, for example, was reinforced by 
denying court access to claims related to unregistered marriages.215 Moreover, although it re-
frained from explicitly negating the validity of temporary marriages, the new law did strictly 
prohibit such alliances from being registered.216 Last but not least, the Family Protection Law 
also increased the marriageable age for females to 18 and for males to 20.217 Girls could be giv-
en into marriage earlier, though not before the age of 15, provided that they had reached the 
requisite degree of physical development and the marriage was agreed upon by both the pub-
lic prosecutor and the court.218 
 
b) Islamic Revolution 
In the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, a powerful cleric, succeeded in 
overturning the Iranian monarchy and proclaiming the Islamic Republic of Iran. The new con-
stitution adopted in December of that year and still in force today marks the complete take-
 
207 Art. 1041 of the Civil Code of 1935. Cf. D. A. MOMENI, The Difficulties of Changing the Age at Marriage in Iran, Vol. 34 No. 
3 Journal of Marriage and Family 545-551, at 545 et seq. (1972). 
208 Art. 3 of the Marriage Act of 1931 as amended in 1937. If the girl had not even reached the age of 13 years or if she was 
physically harmed as a result of the marriage the punishment was more severe, cf. MOMENI, supra note 207 at 546. 
209 Art. 1 Para. 3 Marriage Act of 1931 as amended in 1937. Authors seem to differ as to whether unregistered marriages were 
denied legal validity or not, cf. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 16 at 166; Z. MIR-HOSSEINI, Women and Politics in Post-Khomeini 
Iran: Divorce, Veiling and Emerging Feminist Voices, in H. Afshar (Ed.), Women and Politics in the Third World 142-170, at 
145 (1996); N. YASSARI, An Islamic Alternative: Temporary Marriage, in J. M. Scherpe & N. Yassari (Eds.), The Legal Status of 
Cohabitants 557-569, at 559, footnote 14 (2005) (affirmative); M. ENAYAT, Iran, in A. Bergmann & M. Ferid & D. Henrich 
(Eds.), Internationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht mit Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, at 38 (2002) (negative). 
210 Art. 1 Para. 2 of the Marriage Act of 1931 as amended in 1937. 
211 Cf. Part One, II; BAKHTIAR, supra note 23 at 403. 
212 Cf. ERTÜRK, supra note 203 at 5. 
213 For a detailed evaluation of the minimum age legislation of the 1930s cf. MOMENI, supra note 207 at 546 et seq. 
214 Cf. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 209 at 145; L. HALPER, Law and Iranian Women’s Activism, in Z. R. Kassam (Ed.), Women 
and Islam 3-18, at 5 (2010). 
215 See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 16 at 166. 
216 See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 16 at 166. 
217 Art. 23 of the Family Protection Law as revised in 1975. 
218 Art. 23 of the Family Protection Law as revised in 1975. 
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over of the state by the Shiite clergy, fusing its democratic and theocratic elements.219 It is deep-
ly influenced by the authority structure prevalent in Shia Islam and confers great powers to the 
spiritual leader.220 The constitution ordains that all forms of state legislation be compliant with 
the sharia, with the consequence that any laws which contradict the sharia are null and void.221 
In the aftermath of the revolution, the majority of the laws enacted under the Shah were not in 
fact repealed by the clergy, but were incorporated into the law of the republic instead.222 Thus, 
the Family Protection Law was never formally suspended, but simply declared un-Islamic in a 
personal statement by Khomeini.223 Indeed, some of its provisions did continue to be applied, 
though these related solely to matters of relative insignificance.224  
During the period of re-Islamisation which followed the revolution, the question of marriagea-
ble age was re-visited as part of the 1983 revision of the Civil Code, and this revision also en-
compassed article 1041. The revised provision generally prohibits marriage before the age of 
majority,225 which, in line with classical Shia doctrine, is defined as nine years for girls and 15 
years for boys.226 Marriage before puberty is permissible by way of exception, if the guardian 
approves of the marriage and the alliance serves the spouses’ ‘best interests’.227 One provision 
which is at variance with classical Shia law is that a woman who has never been married before 
must obtain her guardian’s consent for the conclusion of a marriage contract, even if she has 
already reached full legal majority.228 
The 1983 amendments to the Civil Code – with the exception of the successive revisions to arti-
cle 1041 set out below – are still in force today. The same applies to the Marriage Act of 1931 
which, in common with the Family Protection Law, was not abrogated in the aftermath of the 
revolution. Today, the discrepancies between the wording of article 3 of the Marriage Act and 
the 1983 amendments to the Civil Code are largely ignored in practice on the basis that the 
alteration to the Civil Code also extends to the substance of the Marriage Act, so that the latter 
should be interpreted in the light of the revised Civil Code.229 
 
219 See ARJOMAND, supra note 203 at 116 et seq. 
220 Arts. 5 and 107 of the Constitution of 1979. 
221 Art. 4 of the Constitution of 1979. The power to review the conformity of state legislation with the rules of sharia is be-
stowed on the Guardian Council, a small board of Islamic scholars and jurists (Arts. 4, 72 and 91 of the Constitution of 1979). 
If a draft parliamentary bill is rejected by the Guardian Council, parliament can either go over the draft again or insist on it. If 
the Guardian Council is still unwilling to sanction the draft the matter will be referred to the Exigency Council, which will 
decide based on public welfare, not on conformity with the sharia (Art. 112 of the Constitution of 1979). 
222 See ARJOMAND, supra note 203 at 117. Thus, both the Civil Code of 1935 and the Marriage Act of 1931 as revised in 1937 
remained in force, cf. YASSARI, supra note 209 at 559, footnote 14; MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 201, at 1504 with references. 
223 See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 209 at 145. 
224 The secular courts instituted under the Family Protection Law for example continued to settle disputes until they were 
finally replaced by special civil courts in September 1979, see MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 209 at 145. Similarly, the substantive 
restrictions imposed on polygamy by the Family Protection Law remained in force until 1984, cf. A. R. KOOHESTANI, Towards 
Substantive Equality in Iranian Constitutional Discourse, Vol. 7 No. 2 Muslim World Journal of Human Rights Article 2, 9 
(2011); MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 209 at 145. 
225 Art. 1041 of the Civil Code of 1935 as amended in 1983. 
226 Note 1 to Art. 1210 of the Civil Code of 1935 as amended in 1983. 
227 Note 1 to Art. 1041 of the Civil Code of 1935 as amended in 1983. 
228 Art. 1043 of the Civil Code of 1935 as amended in 1983. Cf. also N. SHID, Selected Aspects of Iranian Family Law, in 
N. Yassari (Ed.), The Shari’a in the Constitutions of Afghanistan, Iran and Egypt – Implications for Private Law 141-152, at 
142 (2005). Therefore, for girls who had not been married before the option of puberty did not, de facto, offer any way out of 
an unwanted marriage. Yet, conversely, if a girl intended to marry and her guardian refused his consent the girl under Art. 
1043 of the Civil Code had the right to apply to the court in order to conclude her marriage. 
229 See ENAYAT, supra note 209 at 36; V. M. MOGHADAM, Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal Status, Social Posi-
tions, and Collective Action, Presenter’s Article for the Conference “Iran After 25 Years of Revolution: A Retrospective and a 
Look Ahead” at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 16 November 2004, available at: 
www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/ValentineMoghadamFinal.pdf [16 November 2012]. 
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Around the year 2000, the Iranian parliament again addressed the minimum age for marriage 
by referring a redraft of article 1041 of the Civil Code to the Guardian Council. This redrafted 
version proposed raising the marriageable age for girls from nine to 13 years, while maintain-
ing the age limit of 15 years for boys.230 The Guardian Council rejected the bill, which the par-
liament then referred to the Council of Exigency for a final decision. That body approved the 
redraft, though it also insisted on an additional clause which permitted the marriage of girls 
younger than 13 years based on the guardian’s consent and the girls’ physical maturity, thus 
rendering the proposed age limitations non-compulsory.231 This version of article 1041 was 
finally adopted and is still in force to this day. It should however be noted that the chairman of 
the Iranian parliament’s legal affairs committee recently announced that the committee is again 
envisaging lowering the marriageable age for girls under article 1041 of the Civil Code back 
down to nine years.232 
In July 2007, a new draft bill for the protection of the family was submitted to the Iranian par-
liament for discussion. Amongst other things, the draft addresses the problem of non-
registration of marriage and provides for compulsory registration of all changes in marital sta-
tus. Most notably, in its original form, the draft also imposed an obligation to register tempo-
rary marriages in order to safeguard the interests not only of the woman, but also of any chil-
dren, who, if born out of a non-registered marriage, typically lack sufficient legal protection 
with regard to healthcare and education.233 In March 2012, however, the Iranian parliament 
passed a new version of the provision which renders registration of temporary marriages op-
tional, except in cases where the woman is pregnant.234 Because it also contains some highly 
controversial provisions relating to polygamy and the taxation of dowers, the rest of the draft 
is currently still awaiting parliamentary ratification.235  
The fact that registration of temporary marriages is not compulsory notably compromises the 
accuracy of the data collected in the latest available demographic surveys on marriage and the 
family.236 The official statistics indicate that in 2006 16.6 percent of women aged 15 to 19 were 
 
230 Previously, parliament had formulated two other drafts in the same matter but the Guardian Council had rejected both 
bills on the grounds that they violated the sharia. The first redraft wanted to reintroduce the age limitations that had been 
implemented by the first version of the Family Protection Law of 1967, i.e. 15 years for girls and 18 years for boys. The sec-
ond redraft suggested raising the minimum age for girls to 14 and for boys to 17 years. Cf. also P. NORTHON, How Many 
Bicameral Legislatures Are There?, Vol. 10 No. 4 Journal of Legislative Studies 1-9, at 5 (2007); N. YASSARI, Das iranische 
Familienrecht und seine Anwendung im Teheraner Familiengericht, in S. Tellenbach & T. Hanstein, Beiträge zum Islami-
schen Recht IV, 59-76, at 70 (2004). 
231 See R. BARLOW & S. AKBARZADEH, Prospects for Feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vol. 30 No. 1 Human Rights 
Quarterly 21-40, at 28 (2008); S. TREMAYNE, Modernity and Early Marriage in Iran: A View from Within, Vol. 2 No. 1 Journal 
of Middle East Women’s Studies 65-94, at 71 (2006); ERTÜRK, supra note 203 at 9. 
232 Cf. TSAI V., Child Bride Practice Rising in Iran, Parliament Seeks to Lower Girl’s Legal Marriage Age to 9, International 
Business Times, 30 August 2012, available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/child-bride-practice-rising-iran-parliament-seeks-
lower-girls-legal-marriage-age-9-760263 [16 November 2012].  
233 Cf. A. OSANLOO, What a Focus on ‘Family’ Means in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in M. Voorhoeve (Ed.), Family Law in 
Islam. Divorce, Marriage and Women in the Muslim World 51 et seq., at 52 (2012). 
234 Art. 22 of the Draft Bill. Cf. http://www.payvand.com/news/12/mar/1064.html [16 November 2012]; 
http://theiranproject.com/blog/2012/03/08/iran-mps-temporary-marriage-registration-not-mandatory-2/ [16 November 2012]; 
TAHMASEBI S., The Family Protection Bill Hurts not only Women but Men and Children too, Interview with Farideh Gheyrat 
on the Family Support Bill, 13 November 2010, available at: http://we-change.org/english/spip.php?article792 [16 November 
2012]. 
235 Cf. http://www.payvand.com/news/10/aug/1318.html [16 November 2012]. For more information on the draft cf. 
I. SCHNEIDER, Civil Society and Legislation: Developments of the Human Rights Situation in Iran in 2008, in H. Elliesie (Ed.), 
Beiträge zum Islamischen Recht VII, Islam and Human Rights, 387-414, passim (2010). 
236 See TREMAYNE, supra note 231 at 71. 
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married.237 A study conducted in 2004/2005 revealed that 16 percent of married women aged 15 
or older had been married before the age of 15 and that 53 percent of women aged 15 to 19 
married of their own free will.238 Furthermore, more recent data compilations also reveal a 
dramatic, 30-percent increase in the number of under-age marriages between 2006 and 2009.239 
Overall, despite the theocratic nature of the Iranian state, there are reform-oriented movements 
in the country which both oppose misinterpretations of the holy sources by clerical leaders and 
call for modernist re-readings of Islamic teaching.240 Strict clerical interpretations do however 
enjoy considerable support in the conservative-dominated Guardian Council, which has prov-
en to be a major obstacle to reform on several occasions.241 
 
c) CEDAW 
In 2003, the Iranian parliament passed a resolution for Iran to join the CEDAW. The bill was 
later rejected by the Guardian Council on the grounds that the provisions of the CEDAW vio-
late both the Iranian constitution and the sharia.242 The Council’s reasoning was based on the 
principles of gender equality in Islam teaching. According to the Islamic notion of equality, 
men and women do not enjoy equal rights, because they are different in nature and therefore 
require different kinds of protection.243 Interestingly, as indicated above, ratification of the 
CEDAW was discussed by both proponents and opponents in an entirely Islamic framework 
which was not in any way influenced by international perceptions of human rights. While 
supporters of the convention argued that the provisions of the CEDAW were compatible with 
Islam, the opponents of the convention put forward arguments demonstrating their incon-
sistency with Islamic teaching.244 Since the proposed adoption of the CEDAW was dismissed 
by the Guardian Council, the matter has now been placed before the Council of Exigency for a 
final decision.245 
 
5. Afghanistan 
 
a) Legal pluralism 
When Afghanistan gained independence from British colonial rule in 1919, its legal system 
exhibited a complex, triple-layered structure comprising elements of Islamic, customary and 
statutory law. In everyday life, Islamic and customary law played a much more important role 
than statutory law, since they had already held sway in Afghanistan for centuries, whereas 
state regulation had only been introduced by the Afghan rulers in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. The Afghan population was a heterogeneous composition of various differ-
ent tribes, ethnicities and religious communities. For them, Islamic law provided a common 
 
237 See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, supra note 107. 
238 Cf. A. KIAN-THIÉBAUT, From Motherhood to Equal Rights Advocates: The Weakening of Patriarchal Order, Vol. 38 No. 1 
Iranian Studies 45-66, at 51 et seq. (2005). 
239 Cf. TSAI, supra note 232; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
of 13 September 2012, A/67/369 at 21 et seq., available at: http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-documents/united-
nations-reports/un-reports/1000000196-report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-islamic-
republic-of-iran-13-september-2012.html#.UJ0QtlElrTp [16 November 2012]. 
240 See BARLOW & AKBARZADEH, supra note 231 at 25 et seq. 
241 See ERTÜRK, supra note 203 at 9. 
242 See KOOHESTANI, supra note 224 at 2; MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 201, at 1505; OSANLOO, supra note 233, at 62. 
243 Cf. BARLOW & AKBARZADEH, supra note 231 at 29. The principle is enshrined in Arts. 20 and 21 of the Constitution of 1979. 
244 One argument against the ratification was that the convention’s notion of equality would deprive women of rights which 
they enjoyed under Islamic law such as not being obliged to maintain the family, cf. ERTÜRK, supra note 203 at 8. 
245 See also SCHNEIDER, supra note 235 at 391, 405. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 1 (2013) 
Constitutions Against Revolutions 
Who strangled revolutionary aspirations in North Africa? 013 
Marriage Age in Islamic and Contemporary Muslim Family Laws. A Comparative Survey | by Andrea Büchler and Christina 
Schlatter 
65 
 
ground and identity. It proved to be a consistent, stable body of rules even in times of political 
turbulence and uncertainty. Islamic law was interpreted and applied according to the Hanafi 
school of thought, which was followed by the majority of Afghans.246 Tribal customs, on the 
other hand, often either adapted these religious rules to local needs or, in some instances, en-
tirely overlooked them.247 Customary usages were elaborated through oral traditions, which 
essentially outlined codes of conduct or honour applicable to the members of a specific group 
or clan.248 These codes varied significantly from tribe to tribe and were subject to continual 
change.249 The scope for the application of these codes partly overlapped with sharia law, be-
cause they also addressed matters relating to criminal, property and marriage law.250 Today, 
customary law is still of vital importance among the Afghan tribal structures. Most notably, 
traditional habits such as dispute settlement through so-called jirgas or shuras often serves as a 
basis for the legitimacy of political actions as well as providing a judicial framework for civil 
and criminal law cases.251 
In contrast to Islamic and customary law, statutory legislation, as indicated above, is a much 
more recent phenomenon in Afghanistan. Initially, the Afghan rulers aimed at consolidating 
their leadership through purely administrative measures and left matters of personal status 
and family law fully at the discretion of the sharia and customary law.252 It was not until the 
formation of a modern nation state in Afghanistan in the 1910s that the legal reforms pursued 
by the rulers also extended to personal status law as a means of prohibiting customary practic-
es that had repeatedly caused tribal controversies in the past.253  
One such problem that had attracted the King’s attention was the issue of child marriages. In 
those days, marriages of minors were often arranged by parents in order to return a favour, 
ensure inheritance rights or stabilise bonds between families.254 A law passed by the King in 
 
246 Cf. T. BARFIELD, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, Vol. 60 No. 2 Maine Law Review 347-373, 
352 (2008). A considerable minority of Afghans adhered to the Jafari school of law. However, as outlined below, Shia doc-
trine was not officially recognised as a source of law until 2004. 
247 See C. T. RIPHENBURG, Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Changed Outlook for Women?, Vol. 44 No. 3 Asian Survey 401-421, 410 
(2004). Cf. also M. H. SABOORY, The Progress of Constitutionalism in Afghanistan, in N. Yassari (Ed.), The Shari’a in the 
Constitutions of Afghanistan, Iran and Egypt – Implications for Private Law 5-22, 6 (2005). Remarkably, most of Afghan 
citizens do not have profound knowledge of Islamic law itself and often believe that customary traditions are compatible 
with the sharia, cf. Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private Law and Private International Law, Family Structures and Fami-
ly Law in Afghanistan. A Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Afghanistan January – March 2005, 10 (2005), available at: 
http://www.mpipriv.de/shared/data/pdf/mpi-report_on_family_structures_and_family_law_in_afghanistan.pdf [16 Novem-
ber 2012]. 
248 Cf. BARFIELD, supra note 246 at 351 et seq.; N. YASSARI, Legal Pluralism and Family Law: An Assessment of the Current 
Situation in Afghanistan, in N. Yassari (Ed.), The Shari'a in the Constitutions of Afghanistan, Iran and Egypt – Implications 
for Private Law 45-60, 49 (2005). The most important and well-known customary codex is the Pashtunwali, created by the 
ethnicity of Pashtuns. For more information in this regard see W. STEUL, Paschtunwali: Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche 
Relevanz, passim (1981); SCHNEIDER, supra note 35 at 212 et seq. 
249 Cf. BARFIELD, supra note 246 at 351 et seq. There, BARFIELD also points out the influential power of the religious scholars 
who at times even stepped in and enforced the correction of customary law which they saw as diverging too far from the 
classical sharia. 
250 Cf. KAMALI, supra note 35 at 46; YASSARI, supra note 248 at 49. 
251 Cf. C. JONES-PAULY & N. NOJUMI, Balancing Relations Between Society and State: Legal Steps Toward Reconciliation and 
Reconstruction of Afghanistan, Vol. 52 No. 4 American Journal of Comparative Law 825-857, 829 (2004); SCHNEIDER, supra 
note 35 at 216. The term jirga refers to a gathering of representatives of a tribe or community in order to discuss and decide 
on a specific problem. For more details see YASSARI, supra note 248 at 53. 
252 Cf. also YASSARI, supra note 248 at 47 et seq., 54; BARFIELD, supra note 246 at 353. 
253 Cf. SCHNEIDER, supra note 35 at 222 et seq.; H. TRAVIS, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
3 Northwestern University Journal of Human Rights 1-52, 3 et seq. (2005). 
254 Cf. KAMALI, supra note 35 at 108 et seq. It was also very common for families to exchange their daughters in marriage in 
order to avoid pre-marital expenses or to give a girl into marriage as compensation for a previously committed crime, cf. 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report, Harm-
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1921 prohibited marriage before majority.255 It also abolished the guardian’s power to conclude 
a marriage contract on behalf of his ward in cases where the ward was below 13 years of age.256 
Disputes arising from marriages concluded on behalf of a ward younger than 13 years were 
denied judicial hearing.257 
The Law on Marriage of 1921, as well as other secularising reforms initiated by the King, en-
countered harsh opposition both from clerical circles struggling to maintain their influential 
position and clans fearing for their local authority.258 In 1924, the reforms were discussed in a 
loya jirga, a gathering of the country’s most prominent tribal and clerical leaders. As a result, 
both the Constitution of 1923 and the Law on Marriage of 1921 were amended. In response to 
clerical demands, the revised constitution explicitly named the Hanafi school of law as the offi-
cial Afghan state doctrine.259 Marriage before the age of 13 was tolerated, judicial access was 
granted to claims arising out of such alliances, and the revised law merely emphasised the so-
cial dangers related to early marriage.260 The option of puberty was explicitly enshrined in the 
law for both boys and girls, but it was limited to marriages contracted by any person other 
than the spouses’ father or grandfather.261 
In 1960, another law was promulgated which sought to reduce the incidence of child marriages 
by unequivocally stating that a marriage before the age of 15 was not a marriage of majority.262 
As interpreted by Kamali, this provision was, at most, tantamount to a recommendation of 
adult marriage and fell well short of directly banning child marriages.263 However, the guardi-
an’s compulsory power was curtailed to the extent that he was no longer allowed to conclude a 
marriage contract on behalf of a ward younger than 15 years old if he either had a reputation 
for moral corruption or if the marriage did not safeguard the ward’s best interests.264 Non-
compliance with these requirements rendered the marriage contract invalid and claims related 
to a marriage not evidenced by a valid marriage contract were denied judicial hearing.265 
The objective of the 1960 law was to establish clarity through a clear age requirement. In prac-
tice, however, since Afghanistan lacked a comprehensive birth registration system, the age of 
the spouses could often not be ascertained beyond doubt, thus leaving the final decision to the 
courts’ discretion and significantly curtailing the protection afforded to minors by the law.266 
As a result of the difficulties associated with ascertaining the ages of young spouses, the explic-
                                                                                                                                                                         
ful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan, 15 et 
seq. (2010), available at: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf [16 Novem-
ber 2012]. 
255 Art. 5 of the Nizamnama (Law) of Marriage of 1921. 
256 Art. 6 of the Nizamnama (Law) of Marriage of 1921. See KAMALI, supra note 35 at 110. 
257 Art. 8 of the Nizamnama (Law) of Marriage of 1921. 
258 Cf. YASSARI, supra note 248 at 54 et seq.; BARFIELD, supra note 246 at 348 et seq.; SABOORY, supra note 247 at 6; 
MOGHADAM V., Modernizing Women. Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, 2nd Edition, 238 et seq. (2003). 
259 Art. 2 of the Constitution of 1923 as amended in 1924. See SABOORY, supra note 247 at 6. 
260 Arts. 3 and 5 of the Nizamnama (Law) of Marriage of 1921 as amended in 1924. See KAMALI, supra note 35 at 116, foot-
notes 16 and 17. According to article 5, all disputes in this regard had to be brought before the court until the year 1305 A.H. 
Claims brought later and not evidenced by a document or decisive proof could not be heard by the courts unless the mon-
arch himself authorises the court to entertain them. 
261 Art. 9 of the Nizamnama (Law) of Marriage of 1921 as amended in 1924. See KAMALI, supra note 35 at 116, footnote 18. 
262 Art. 2 of the Law on Marriage of 1960. 
263 See KAMALI, supra note 35 at 112. 
264 Art. 19 of the Law on Marriage of 1960. See KAMALI, supra note 35 at 113. 
265 Arts. 5 and 18 of the Law on Marriage of 1960. Yet, an exception was to be made if there was a child born from such a 
marriage or if neither of the spouses contested the marriage, see KAMALI, supra note 35 at 113, footnote 20; H. MALIKYAR, 
Development of Family Law in Afghanistan: The Roles of the Hanafi Madhab, Customary Practices and Power Politics, Vol. 
16 No. 3 Central Asian Survey 389-399, at 394 (1997). 
266 Cf. KAMALI, supra note 35 at 117. 
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it statutory marriage age was eventually abandoned when this law was revised in 1971 and 
substituted by a relatively vague clause stating that the marriage of a bride and groom below 
the age of majority was not a marriage of majority.267 Apart from this purely formal modifica-
tion, the remaining measures set out by the 1960 law to prevent the guardian from abusing his 
powers were maintained.268 Access to court was broadened, as courts were now also allowed to 
hear marriage-related claims in cases where the marriage was established by reliable witness 
statements that a marriage had been concluded or that the couple were cohabiting as man and 
wife.269 
 
b) The Civil Code of 1977 
In 1973, Afghanistan became a republic and subsequently adopted a new constitution. With the 
enactment of the new Civil Code in 1977, personal status and family law was comprehensively 
codified for the first time.270 The code was mainly based on the Hanafi school of thought, 
though it also incorporated a number of elements taken from the Maliki school of law and the 
French Civil Code.271 The code emphasised the precedence of statutory law over Islamic law.272 
Article 70 of the Civil Code defined the minimum marriageable age as 16 for girls and 18 for 
boys. Girls below this age could only be given in marriage by their guardian if judicial permis-
sion was sought and obtained and if they were at least 15 years old.273 A woman with full legal 
majority was granted the right to conclude a marriage on her own.274 This autonomy in con-
tracting a marriage was congruent with both the classical Hanafi position and with article 517 
of the Penal Code adopted in 1976, which also classified certain forms of forced marriage as 
criminal offences.275 Moreover, the Civil Code eventually also introduced the mandatory regis-
tration of marriages as well as other changes in marital status law.276 
In theory, the Civil Code of 1977 was intended to replace the application of uncodified sharia 
and customary law norms, particularly with regard to harmful traditional practices such as 
child marriage and the sale of children, mostly girls, in return for goods or favours.277 In fact, 
however, the practical implementation of statutory measures preventing these practices was 
 
267 Art. 3 of the Law on Marriage of 1971. An electronic version of the document is available at: 
http://www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/lom1971ogn190p1971080813500517a383/ [16 November 2012]; cf. also KAMALI, supra 
note 35 at 122 et seq., who also indicates that in the preceding parliamentary debate different proposals for the formulation of 
this article had been made, such as retaining the age limit of 15 years or setting it at an even higher level. 
268 Art. 20 of the Law on marriage of 1971, according to which the guardian was not permitted to conclude a marriage con-
tract on behalf of his ward if he had a bad moral reputation or the marriage was of no benefit to the minor. 
269 Art. 37 of the Law on Marriage of 1971 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1991/21:IX.1350/1971. For more details see KAMA-
LI, supra note 35 at 125 et seq. 
270 Cf. YASSARI, supra note 248 at 56. An electronic version of the document is available at: 
http://www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/clotroacogn353p1977010513551015a650/ [16 November 2012]. 
271 Cf. YASSARI, supra note 248 at 56; Schneider, supra note 35 at 212. 
272 Art. 1 Para. 2 of the Civil Code of 1977 permitted the application of Islamic law only where no statutory provision exists. 
This article was in conformity with Art. 99 of the new constitution which had been enacted in 1977 and allowed courts to 
apply sharia law based on the Hanafi opinion only in the absence of statutory law. 
273 Art. 71 of the Civil Code of 1977. 
274 Art. 80 of the Civil Code of 1977, see MALIKYAR, supra note 265 at 394. 
275 Under Art. 517 Para. 1 of the Penal Code of 1976 any person giving in marriage a widow or a woman of 18 years or older 
contrary to her will was liable to imprisonment. Para. 2 of the same article aggravated the punishment in cases where the 
marriage was concluded as compensation for a previously committed crime. An electronic version of the document is availa-
ble at: http://www.cicr.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/6fa4d35e5e3025394125673e00508143/845809a497304d8fc12571140033ac69/$FILE/Penal%20Code%20-
%20Afghanistan%20-%20EN.pdf [16 November 2012]. 
276 Arts. 48 and 61 of the Civil Code of 1977. 
277 According to Art. 1 of the Civil Code of 1977 the application of religious law is not permitted unless the code contains no 
provision on a particular matter, see YASSARI, supra note 248 at 56. 
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far from systematic and they continued to occur, particularly in rural areas where centralised 
state control held little sway.278 Generally speaking, statutory interventions were not as readily 
accepted by the Afghan population as sharia and customary law norms, a circumstance which 
was at least partly attributable to the instability of the political situation and the corresponding 
decline of confidence in state institutions.279 
Shortly after the enactment of the Civil Code in 1977, the political climate underwent a further 
major change when power was seized by a communist regime driven by the ambition to turn 
Afghanistan into a modern socialist state. In addition to radical land reforms and the enact-
ment of a provisional constitution, reforms in the field of personal status law were also part of 
the communist agenda.280 A decree issued by the communist Revolutionary Council in 1978 
aimed at abolishing discriminatory marital customs directly challenged the Islamic notion of 
gender equality.281 It declared engagements and marriages involving girls below 16 and boys 
below 18 years of age to be punishable offences, thus making the rules set forth in the Civil 
Code more stringent.282 Faced with massive protests by both tribes and clerics alike, the gov-
ernment later suspended the decree on gender equality along with its legislation on land re-
forms.283 
Political instability continued when the communist regime was overthrown by a coalition of 
Islamist warlords, the so-called mujaheddin, and did not come to an end until internal power 
struggles among the warlords gave way to the rise of the Taliban, an extremely conservative 
Islamist sect, in 1996. 
 
c) Taliban rule 
The Taliban movement’s ideology was in some respects similar to that of the Wahhabist doc-
trine. The Taliban strove to establish a theocratic state under the strict rule of sharia in its pri-
mordial form.284 All laws enacted under the communist regime were revoked and those which 
had been in force prior to the communist takeover were re-enacted.285 Courts were instructed 
to follow a strict interpretation of the sharia with due regard to the Hanafi school of thought.286 
Priority was also given to the eradication of customary practices which the Taliban deemed 
contradictory to Islamic law. Paradoxically, the Taliban themselves generally lacked any pro-
found knowledge of either the theological foundations of Islamic jurisprudence or its classical 
methods.287 
 
 
278 See YASSARI, supra note 248 at 47, 56; KAMALI, supra note 35 at 126 et seq. 
279 Cf. also BARFIELD, supra note 246 at 348; V. M. MOGHADAM, Revolution, the State, Islam, and Women: Gender Politics in 
Iran and Afghanistan, 22 Social Text 40-61, 44 (1989). 
280 See H. AHMED-GOSH, A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future Or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: 
Women in Afghanistan, Vol. 4 No. 3 Journal of International Women’s Studies 1-14, 6 (2003); SABOORY, supra note 247 at 13. 
One of the most contested issues was the education of girls, cf. MOGHADAM, supra note 279 at 56. 
281 Decree No. 7 of 1978 of the Revolutionary Council. Arts. 1 and 2 for instance outlawed the practice of giving a woman in 
marriage in return for money or other favours cf. MOGHADAM, supra note 279 at 47. The impetus of the communist legisla-
tion did not take into account customary or religious peculiarities but was driven by a purely autonomous notion of equality, 
cf. SCHNEIDER, supra note 35 at 223. 
282 Arts. 5 and 6 of the Decree No. 7 of 1978 of the Revolutionary Council. 
283 Cf. KAMALI, supra note 35 at 128; AHMED-GOSH, supra note 280 at 6; W. M. RAHIMI, Status of Women: Afghanistan, 31 
Social and Human Sciences in Asia and the Pacific: Afghanistan 1, at 29 (1991). 
284 Cf. TRAVIS, supra note 253 at 12 et seq.; N. NOJUMI, The Rise and Fall of the Taliban, in R. D. Crews & A. Tarzi (Eds.), The 
Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan 90, at 91 (2008). 
285 – albeit with the exception of all provisions related to the monarchy, see SABOORY, supra note 247 at 17. 
286 See SABOORY, supra note 247 at 18. 
287 See TRAVIS, supra note 253 at 13; SABOORY, supra note 247 at 18. 
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d) Process of reconstruction 
After the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, the political reconstruction of Afghanistan was 
initiated by an agreement signed in Bonn, Germany.288 This document reinstated the Constitu-
tion of 1964 as well as most of the laws and regulations in force prior to the communist era.289 
Accordingly, the Civil Code of 1977 re-entered the statute books in 2001.290 A new constitution 
was adopted in January 2004 which declares Islam to be both the state religion and the bench-
mark for statutory legislation.291 
Today, the statutory approach to child marriage sets out clear limitations. As outlined above, 
the reinstated Civil Code defines the marriageable age as 16 years for girls and 18 years for 
boys and prohibits the conclusion of a marriage contract by a guardian on behalf of girls 
younger than 15 years.292 A new standard marriage contract introduced by the Supreme Court 
of Afghanistan in 2007 in accordance with the Civil Code stipulates that the girl should be at 
least 16 years old at the time of marriage.293 Moreover, in 2009, a new Law on Elimination of 
Violence against Women was enacted. Its primary goal is to eliminate harmful customary prac-
tices which have no basis in Islamic law.294 The law qualifies specific practices as acts of vio-
lence against women, including the selling or buying of women in the context of marriage, 
forced marriage and marriage before the minimum legal age.295 This law also urges the gov-
ernment to take both protective and informative measures to eliminate these practices.296 
A further notable development was the Shia Personal Status Law, which came into force in 
2009 and was designed to address the special needs of Afghanistan’s large Shiite minority.297 
 
288 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements of 5 Decemver 2001. An electronic version of the document is available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm [16 November 2012]. 
289 Art. II, Para. 1 of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements of 5 December 2001. The agreement also established an 
interim authority which was empowered to repeal or modify these laws. Cf. also A. WARDAK, Building a Post-War System in 
Afghanistan, 41 Crime, Law and Social Change 319-341, 328 (2004). 
290 Cf. M. H. KAMALI, Islam and its Shari‘a in the Afghan Constitution 2004 with Special Reference to Personal Law, in 
N. Yassari (Ed.), The Shari’a in the Constitutions of Afghanistan, Iran and Egypt – Implications for Private Law 23-44, 39 
(2005); I. SCHNEIDER, Recent Developments in Afghan Family Law: Research Aspects, 104 ASIEN 106-118, at 109 (2007). 
291 Under Art. 2 of the Constitution of 2004, Islamic law can only be applied in the absence of a statutory provision. Art. 3 of 
the Constitution ordains that no law or international convention be in contradiction with Islam. The power to review the 
constitutionality of national laws and treaties is vested in the Supreme Court (Art. 121 of the Constitution of 2004). See 
D. KANDIYOTI, Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Islam and Women’s Rights, Vol. 28 No. 3 
Third World Quarterly 503-517, 506 et seq. (2007). Under art. 54 of the Constitution, the state shall adopt any necessary 
measures to attain the physical and spiritual health of the family, including the elimination of related traditions contrary to 
the principles of Islam. An electronic version of the document is available at: 
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/cms/uploads/images/Constitution/The%20Constitution.pdf [16 November 2012]. 
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This law contains distinct provisions with regard to marriageable age and the marriage of mi-
nors. It differentiates between marriages of minors and marriages of adults and makes the 
former conditional on either the guardian’s approval or judicial permission.298 Male puberty is 
defined as occurring at the age of 15 years or at the time of first ejaculation, while female pu-
berty is marked by the onset of menstruation. Both these definitions are compatible with the 
classical Shia interpretation.299 Furthermore, the validity of a virgin girl’s marriage contract is 
contingent upon her own consent and the permission of her guardian or, failing that, the per-
mission of a court.300 A husband consummating a marriage before his wife reaches puberty is 
liable to punishment.301 Last but not least, the law also enshrines the option of puberty for both 
sexes, though only in cases where a marriage concluded by a guardian does not safeguard the 
ward’s best interests.302 
Despite these substantial efforts to reduce the incidence of child marriages, it should be re-
membered that, for as long as it has existed, statutory legislation in Afghanistan has never real-
ly succeeded in taking the place of either religious law or traditional practices. The poverty, 
illiteracy and the lack of economic development which long periods of war have brought in 
their wake have all served to obstruct the practical implementation of statutory legislation, as 
indeed has the somewhat hostile approach taken to such norms by the tribal authorities and, 
perhaps most importantly of all, widespread unawareness of their existence among the general 
population. There are thus numerous reasons why, even today, Afghanistan’s official legal 
framework has relatively little bearing on the legal realities of everyday life. A good example of 
this can be seen in the fact that only about five percent of marriages are estimated to be regis-
tered at all, even though such registration is mandated by article 61 of the Civil Code.303 Simi-
larly, the clear tenets set out in the statutory legislation with regard to child marriage have 
clearly yet to become fully effective, since, according to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and a 
number of NGOs, up to 57 percent of girls are in fact married before the age of 16.304 This prob-
lem is aggravated by the absence of a nationwide birth registration system and the fact that, as 
a result, marriages are ordinarily concluded based upon simple estimates of the spouses’ ag-
es.305 Moreover, studies carried out by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commis-
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sion indicate that somewhere between 60 and 80 percent of all marriages involve coercion.306 
Actual enforcement of either marital age requirements or the precondition of free consent rare-
ly occurs in practice, because infringements of these rules are scarcely punished.307 The law in 
this area is thus clearly ineffective, even if the data supporting this contention are not fully reli-
able. Due to lack of birth and marriage registration, data are not collected comprehensively and 
the indications that are available are thus often based on little more than rough estimates.308 
Another factor which could potentially affect the enforceability of statutory measures is the 
power vested in the the Supreme Court under article 121 of the Constitution to strike down 
both national and international legislation which it deems contradictory to Islam. It should be 
noted that the Supreme Court has not yet assessed the constitutionality of the 2009 law on vio-
lence against women, and it is unclear at this stage what position it will adopt on this matter. 
 
e) CEDAW 
In 2003, as part of the reconstruction process, Afghanistan became a signatory to the CEDAW. 
It is noteworthy that government ratified the convention without reservations and its applica-
bility was reconfirmed by the 2004 constitution.309 Practical implementation of the CEDAW 
does however face the same obstacles as state legislation in general. Furthermore, in 2004, some 
conservative members of parliament objected that the convention had been signed by the inter-
im authority only, which – in the view of these conservative parliamentarians – did not possess 
the power to enter into such a commitment on behalf of the Afghan nation.310 Also, as is the 
case with the 2009 law on violence against women, the Supreme Court has not yet assessed the 
constitutionality of the CEDAW.  
 
III. Conclusion 
In general, the classical schools of Islamic legal thought tend to regard child marriage as a form 
of matrimony which, though very controversial, is nevertheless admissible. Islamic scholars 
generally recognise the option of giving minors into marriage before puberty, and they usually 
equate the onset of puberty with the beginning of autonomous marriage capacity. In the ab-
sence of physical signs, scholarly opinions assume that puberty commences at slightly different 
lunar ages which, depending on the school, are either the same for both sexes or a little higher 
for male spouses. The range of marriageable ages for males extends from 15 years according to 
the Hanbali, the Shafi’i and the Jafari schools to 17 or 18 years in Hanafi and Maliki teaching. 
For female spouses, the range of marriageable ages extends from a high of 17 years, as repre-
sented by the Hanafi school, to 15 years according to both Shafi’i and Hanbali opinion, and 
down to as little as nine years according to Jafari teaching. 
To a large extent, neither the institution of marriage involving minors, nor the assumption that 
young people have the necessary capacities to marry at such ages correspond to the notion of 
marriageability underlying modern human rights treaties. This divergence is not an exclusively 
Arab or Islamic problem, and until recently was still observable in other parts of the world. It is 
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however the case that, to date, sharia lies at the heart of virtually every modern Muslim family 
law system, a circumstance attributable to the fact that colonial rulers prioritised the moderni-
sation of public, commercial and procedural law over reforms to personal status law. As a re-
sult, the area of the private and the family law became the exception within state legislation in 
Muslim countries, which irrevocably associated family law with an intrinsic Islamic identity.311 
To date, the close links between religion and family-law matters have resulted in many nation-
al legislators exercising considerable restraint when attempting to enact statutory reforms in 
marriage law. One legislative approach – as exemplified by the initiatives taken in Egypt at the 
beginning of the twentieth century – is to circumvent the state’s strict adherence to a specific 
school of Islamic law by eclectically incorporating more liberal interpretations from other 
schools of law into statutory provisions, thus preserving the supremacy of Islamic law. Anoth-
er approach is that of introducing reforms on a merely procedural level and abstaining from 
any direct, substantive challenges to the established sharia rules. This, again, is best exempli-
fied by the Egyptian legislation of 1923, which denied judicial access to claims arising from 
under-age and unregistered marriages. In addition to these more unobtrusive initiatives, other 
statutory approaches have even ventured into the very essence of sharia rules by completely 
replacing them with ‘modern’ provisions modelled on European codes or based on new and 
autonomous concepts. A striking example of direct interventions of this kind can be seen in 
Afghanistan, where the Civil Code of 1977 curtailed a guardian’s power to contract his minor 
female ward into marriage below the age of 15. 
These various initiatives have resulted in a considerable number of reforms, which have gener-
ally had the effect of raising the legal marriageable age. These reforms have been, and continue 
to be, carried out against a background of increasing public awareness of the harmful potential 
of early marriage and of intensified efforts in support of reform by human and women’s rights 
activists. It is through this prism that the ratifications of international human rights treaties 
such as the CEDAW need to be viewed. However, precisely because family law on the national 
level is generally considered a specifically Islamic affair, international human rights obligations 
are likely to be perceived as unjustified Western interventions devoid of the necessary under-
standing of, and respect for, Islamic values.312 In terms of marriage and the family, the main 
problem here is the basic conception of gender roles in Islam which, by its very nature, contra-
dicts transnational notions of human rights and gender equality. Reform-minded governments 
and rulers face the difficult task of reconciling international commitments with conservative 
religious demands and, as a consequence, often resort to relatively vague, yet far-reaching, 
reservations. In this regard, state institutions vested with the power to assess the constitution-
ality of statutory provisions, especially those associated with international conventions, have 
the potential to provide an important reforming counterweight to more traditional family-law 
notions, as the example set by the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court demonstrates. Con-
versely, these very same constitutional bodies can, when subject to strong conservative, reli-
gious influences, also constitute major impediments to reform as is the case with the Iranian 
Guardian Council. A similar constellation may also arise in cases where religious authorities, 
even when they lack any formal authority to carry out judicial reviews, exercise substantial 
political power and prestige of the kind enjoyed by the ulama in Saudi Arabia. 
 
311 See ABU-ODEH, supra note 39 at 1087. 
312 The same applies to national legislation based on alien ideological concepts such as Decree No. 7 of 1978 of the Marxist 
Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan. 
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The problems encountered by family-law reform extend far beyond the purely legislative level. 
Indeed, it is with regard to implementation and application of the law that the majority of diffi-
culties occur. In the case of under-age and premature marriage, for example, numerous statis-
tics have shown that statutory reforms, even though enacted, do not in fact have any practical 
consequences for large parts of the population. In some instances, this can be attributed to the 
state-controlled administration of law, in particular with regard to the judiciary and the institu-
tions of criminal prosecution. Evidence from Egypt and Morocco shows that, in addition to the 
lack of appropriate training, it is the personal perceptions of judges and registry office officials 
which are often the root cause of even the most clearly formulated statutory law provisions 
being flouted, particularly in cases where there is wide scope for judicial and administrative 
discretion. Similarly, the fact that a child marriage is a criminal offence is meaningless in juris-
dictions, such as Afghanistan, where offenders are not prosecuted. 
The authority of the state often also lacks the operational wherewithal to enforce the law, as 
well as being overcome by geographical or political difficulties, as is the case in Morocco and 
Afghanistan. A critical factor here is the documentation of births and marriages, which is an 
essential prerequisite for any kind of state control. While the non-registration of births affects 
the practicability of statutory standards, the non-registration of marriages not only has severe 
consequences for any children born of the marriage, but also completely nullifies any of the 
protection afforded by statutory prescriptions, particularly as far as marital age requirements 
are concerned. The extreme example of Afghanistan illustrates the direct correlation between 
the absence of a comprehensive, functioning registration system and the failure of law en-
forcement. Commenting on this matter, Schneider recommends transferring the registration 
authority to local clerics or mullahs rather than to civil courts or registry office officials as a 
means of maintaining familiar and reliable structures which members of the public do not pri-
marily associate with the presence of the state.313 
The inefficacy of statutory law is also connected to the phenomenon of legal pluralism, i.e. the 
coexistence of indigenous, traditional customary law alongside statutory norms. These cus-
tomary rules generally have their origins in the pre-Islamic era and, in contrast to classical Is-
lamic law, are not uniform in character but vary significantly between specific tribes or ethnici-
ties. Despite the deeply held religious convictions which generally characterise traditional 
clans, child marriage is a very common phenomenon. Poverty, property considerations and the 
need to keep peace between families are usually prioritised over free choice, and the idea of 
physical maturity as a prerequisite of marriage is generally regarded as a minor consideration. 
Taken together, these various factors all conspire to reduce the average age at which young 
spouses first marry. 
Compared to tradition and religion, state legislation does not command anything like the same 
level of recognition among tribal populations, being, as it is, a much more recent phenomenon, 
which lacks both traditional and religious legitimation and is often perceived as a threat to 
ethnic tribal autonomy. This is well illustrated by the example of marriage registration, where 
statutory measures, such as the limitation of judicial access to claims arising from registered or 
documentarily evidenced marriages, often fail to achieve their objective and in fact prompt 
tribal counteraction, as can be seen in both Morocco and Afghanistan.314 There is also evidence 
that social barriers can give rise to personal inhibitions against the enforcement of rights guar-
anteed by statutory law. Court proceedings, for example, are often simply not initiated due to 
 
313 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 290 at 113 et seq.; SCHNEIDER, supra note 35 at 218. 
314 Cf. SCHNEIDER, supra note 35 at 221, 226. 
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fears of social condemnation or public pressure resulting from a general consensus in favour of 
traditional methods of dispute resolution. For women, this situation can be further aggravated 
by the fact that in some legal systems judicial protection is contingent on male representation. 
Moreover, as a result of illiteracy and the inadequate provision of education, large parts of the 
population are often not even aware of the protection afforded to them by state legislation, nor 
are they necessarily familiar with classical Islamic rules. Both these factors tend to foster adher-
ence to customary law.  
Recapitulating the sensitive nature of Muslim family law in general and child marriage in par-
ticular, and taking into account the multi-layered structure of the various specific difficulties 
arising in this area, it is hard to imagine that attempts at reform at the international level will 
ever succeed in bringing about substantive changes. The inability to consider local circum-
stances and contexts – which is very much in evidence even at the national level – is far more 
pronounced at the international level. International human rights initiatives naturally tend to 
articulate their demands in the form of general, universally applicable principles which lack 
any tangible local dimensions. As a result, global human rights activism is confronted with an 
intrinsic dilemma, which Merry describes as follows, ‘Rights need to be presented in local cul-
tural terms to be persuasive, but they must challenge existing relations of power in order to be 
effective.’315 Merry argues that human rights require translation into local, i.e. vernacular, 
meanings of relationships and power.316 The main task is to transfer attitudes towards marriage 
and the family from the private to the public domain and to shift local conceptions of permissi-
ble and reprehensible practices over time.317 
At this stage internal actors such as social movements or human rights NGOs are needed to 
mediate between the international and the local level in order to contextualise human rights 
and make them both accessible and acceptable.318 In this regard, Merry rightly points out that it 
is important to take advantage of the adaptability of local customs and the fact that culture – if 
understood as a product of historical implications in a constant state of flux, rather than as a 
fixed, immutable set of habits and customs – can be a driving force for social change.319 It re-
mains to be seen if this will, over time, succeed in shifting conceptions of marriage and maturi-
ty and reconcile them with international standards in this area. 
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